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HOLLY ADAMS
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ABSTRACT
This study was designed to investigate the relationships between executive function,
impulsivity, and personality within consumer behavior. In particular, this study tested whether
executive function influences consumer decision making. In order to answer that question, three
datasets were analyzed. In Study 1A, a dataset was collected of self-report measures (N=6,122) and
was analyzed to investigate the role of executive function with impulsiveness and personality on
consumer behavior. In this dataset, a self-report measure for executive function (EFI) was
employed. In Study 1B., a second data set (N=6,000) of self-report measures was collected and
analyzed to validate the results from the first data set. In Study 2, behavioral measures of inhibitory
control, cognitive flexibility, and working memory capacity were subsequently analyzed to identify
relations with consumer behavior. Additionally, a correlational analysis was conducted on the selfreport measure Executive Function Index (EFI), with cognitive measures previously determined to
measure cognitive flexibility, working memory, and executive attention in order to identify
variance overlap with executive functioning. Results for these studies demonstrated that
components of executive function—particularly inhibitory control and working memory
capacity—are related to impulsive consumer decision making. Further, these data illuminate the
relation between a self-report measure of executive function and performance-based assessments.
It appears that the Executive Function Index may be more closely related to self-reported
personality than to task-based inhibition, working memory, or cognitive flexibility.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Why do we purchase products? More specifically, when and why do we buy products or
services on impulse rather than as planned purchases? Scholars in the fields of psychology,
marketing, and decision sciences have contributed to the consumer behavior literature, enhancing
our understanding of the question, “Why do we buy products?” Within this research, impulsive
consumer behavior has emerged as one category within the broader realm of consumer decision
making. Psychologists have proposed that the cognitive construct of executive function largely
accounts for impulsive behavior in general. The literature on executive function and its
components is large and growing rapidly, driven by studies of its role in behavioral issues such
as: impulsiveness in individuals with attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder (ADHD;
Barkley, 1997; Brown, 2009); risk-taking by adolescents (Romer, Betancourt, Broadsky, &
Giannetta, 2009; 2011); violence and aggression (Sequin, Bolerice, Harden, Trembley, & Pihl,
1991); and substance use (Giancola & Tarter, 1999; Dolan, Bichara, & Nathan, 2008). However,
less research has been published on the relations between the components of executive function
and impulsiveness as expressed in consumer behavior.
This study is designed to investigate these relations between executive function,
personality, and impulsive consumer behavior. Specifically, this study seeks to identify the
relationship between individual differences in components of executive function—set-switching
(cognitive flexibility), executive attention (inhibition), and working memory capacity (updating)
— with impulsiveness and personality traits (conscientiousness, openness to experience,
neuroticism, extroversion, and agreeableness) within impulsive consumer purchasing behavior.
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1.1

Background
1.1.1

Consumer behavior

With the rise of the Industrial Revolution, human consumption—specifically a culture of
consumption—increased among various groups of people in Europe (Jansson-Boyd, 2010). By
the nineteenth century, academics began to identify the impact of material possessions on
individuals. James (1890, 1950) discussed how “a man’s Self” was the accumulation of “not only
his body and psychic powers” but also his “clothes, his house” among relationships and his
work; he also claimed, “If they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant. If they dwindle and die
away, he feels cast down” (pp. 291-292). The field that subsequently was founded in the mid20th century on the foundation of James’s writings was originally referred to as buyer behavior;
but later became known as the psychology of consumer behavior. Consequently, this field seeks
to understand the psychology of human consumption.
Consumer behavior can be defined as how individuals or groups choose, use, and discard
products, services, experiences, or ideas to satisfy needs or desires (Kuester, 2012). It
encompasses behaviors and outcomes, including (but certainly not limited to): management of
personal finances, planned or impulsive purchases, information research of products and
services, group identification, and risk-taking behaviors. The study of consumer behavior,
therefore, is the study of the processes involved when people engage in choosing and purchasing
services, products, experiences, or ideas. The investigation of these processes includes not just
the moment of exchange, but an entire timeline: pre-purchase planning or non-planning,
purchase engagement and decision (exchange), and post-purchase (feelings of
remorse/satisfaction, disposal, and/or influence upon others).
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During the course of a purchase, an individual must engage in decision making and
judgment using either affective influence, habitual or automatic response, or a more controlled,
deliberate approach (Solomon, 2015). These decisions—including automatic, habitual or “snap”
judgments, or carefully-planned, controlled, rational decisions—ultimately reflect patterns of
behavior for consumers. Individual differences exist within consumer groups on what types of
purchases require certain types of decisions. In other words, one individual may make a snap
decision when purchasing a car because she likes the color red, while another individual requires
substantial research and deliberation on horsepower and fuel efficiency to arrive at the same
conclusion to purchase. All of these decisions of consumption are informed by an individual’s
cognitive ability and personality.
Of the types of decisions (affective/emotional, habitual/automatic, or controlled/planned)
consumers make, a pattern of impulsive purchasing can emerge. Marketing researchers have
published many studies on this type of consumer behavior, typically with the intent to identify
and predict impulsive buyers’ behavior, thus aiding companies in their marketing strategies.
Clover (1950) identified impulse purchase behavior as indistinguishable from unplanned
purchases. Applebaum (1951) proposed impulsive purchasing as the outcome of unplanned
purchasing plus exposure to an external stimulus. Nesbitt (1959) added to Applebaum’s
definition of impulsive purchasing by offering the perspective of impulse purchase behavior as
“intelligent.” He theorized intelligent shoppers took advantage of in-store promotions instead of
pre-planning their purchases and, in doing so, maximized their purchasing potential. Stern (1962)
differentiated four types of impulsive purchase behavior: Planned, Pure, Reminder, and
Suggestion. Within all of these types, exposure to external stimuli was considered an integral
part of the impulse purchase experience. Rook (1987) subsequently defined impulsive purchase

3
behavior as unexpected purchases unplanned before entering a retail outlet, resulting in rapid
purchase decision, preceded by a strong urge to possess a product or service, and reflecting the
consumer’s emotional and cognitive response to a sudden stimulus. Within this definition, Rook
and Koch (1985) incorporated five specific elements: (a) feeling a “spontaneous desire to act;”
(b) being in a state of “psychological disequilibrium;” (c) feeling “emotional/psychological
conflict and struggle;” (d) reduced “cognitive evaluation;” and (e) purchase “without regard for
outcome or consequence” (p. 23). Rook argued that his definition encompassed impulsive
purchasing as a more “hedonically complex” experience with emotional conflict and more
emotional than rational (p. 191).
Piron (1991) added to Rook’s definition, considering impulsive purchase as an unplanned
purchase induced by exposure to either an external or internal stimulus that was spontaneous or
sudden, causing emotional and/or cognitive reactions, and followed by one’s “discounting of
own responsibility” (p. 513). Piron’s addition to the definition by addressing personal
responsibility acknowledges the outcome of ongoing consequences to personal finances.
1.1.2

Executive function

Goldstein, Naglieri, Princiotto, and Otero (2014) traced the concept of a control
mechanism back to the case of Phinneas Gage in the 1840s, who experienced an accident
resulting in damage to his left frontal lobe and subsequent “hyperactivity” and loss of inhibition.
James (1890) and other scholars discussed cognitive control, or what may be defined in current
terms as executive function: one’s choice of attending to multiple stimuli or “taking possession
of the mind” to “withdraw[al] from some things in order to deal effectively with others” (p.403).
Broadbent (1953) used Cherry’s cocktail party effect (1953) as a foundation to develop his early
selection model of attention. While not addressing executive function in explicit terms,
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Broadbent proposed the existence of an attention filter that allows individuals to select some
stimulus inputs over others. In his early-selection model, he suggested humans process
information through a sequence of stages, with a filter separating salient information (that which
is to be attended to and allowed to move to encoding) from other information to be ignored.
Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) proposed the need for control processes to allow individuals
to attend selectively to stimuli to maintain information in short-term memory storage without
decay. Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) introduced the concept of controlled and automatic
processing in which repetition allows a task to be performed with fewer cognitive resources. In
other words, the task becomes automatic. Automaticity is characterized as uncontrolled,
effortless, unintentional, and typically occurring outside of awareness. However, Shiffrin and
Schneider found that some tasks required controlled processing, despite repetition. Furthermore,
there were individual differences in which tasks and how much repetition was needed for
automaticity to occur.
Around the same time, Posner and Snyder (1975), building upon Broadbent’s early filter
theory of attention, suggested a type of cognitive control that consisted of an executive aspect of
the attentional system accountable for directing attention on specific or chosen elements of the
environment. Posner suggested three networks of attention: orienting (sensory input), alerting
(awareness), and executive control. According to Posner, the executive control resolved conflict.
In addition, Posner suggested that cognitive control was necessary for an individual to control
thoughts and emotions (Rueda, Posner, & Rothbart, 2004). Posner’s Cognitive Control model
proposed not only a component of selective attention but also an element of inhibitory control, as
he argued cognitive control was also responsible for overriding automatic responses (Posner &
Snyder, 1975).
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Baddeley (1986) subsequently developed the idea of a central executive system within
working memory. His central executive hypothesis proposed an executive feature of cognition
that oversaw/controlled the slave systems of working memory (phonological loop, visuospatial
sketchpad, and episodic buffer). This system coordinates how information is used by the slave
systems by controlling attention designated to tasks engaging information. Baddeley identified
the executive as critical to selective attention, activation of long-term memory, and switching of
retrieval plans.
Norman and Shallice (1980, 1986) proposed a supervisory system that regulates attention
and can override automatic responses. This supervisory system was part of a dual-system model
for action selection comprising both bottom-up (contention scheduling) and top-down
(supervisory system) processes. The contention-scheduling system is responsible for routine
action, and operates according to habits, priming, and similar associative mechanisms. The
supervisory system is the overriding system used for novel action. Each action is composed of a
hierarchy of schemas leading to the proposed action. In the contention-scheduling system,
schemas are activated from environmental triggering, but schemas may also be activated from
the supervisory system based on executive constraints and when conscious attention control is
necessary. In particular, the supervisory system may bias or override the activation of a schema.
Thus, the supervisory system may inhibit activation of schema in routine action and operate as a
control system.
In the subsequent years since the work of Posner, Baddeley, and Norman and Shallice’s
foundational work in executive function theory, many constructs have fallen under the umbrella
of executive function, including working memory, attention control, self-monitoring, selfregulation, initiation, decision making, planning actions, monitoring and metacognition, set-
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switching, inhibitory control, adaptive behavior, and prospective memory. More recent
definitions of executive function emphasize goal-driven behavior. For example, Barkley (2011)
defined executive function as “a self-directed set of actions intended to alter a delayed (future)
outcome” (p.11), and Dawson and Guare (2010) defined executive function similarly by stating,
“Executive skills allow us to organize our behavior over time and override immediate demands
in favor of long-term goals” (p.1).
Most theories of executive function, however, continue to reference Shiffrin and
Schneider’s (1977) original distinction between automatic (i.e., bottom-up, contention scheduled,
stimulus driven, routine, or exogenous) and controlled (top-down, goal oriented, non-routine, or
endogenous) processing. This framework, known as dual-process theory, suggests executive
functioning involves the modulation of the automatic processes by the controlled processes; it is
the process engaged to override habit-driven, environmentally induced automatic behavior in
favor of novel, adaptive, non-habitual but controlled behavior. Dual-process theories of the mind
have been used within many theories in psychology, including attribution theory (Ulemena,
Newman & Moskowitz, 1996), theory of personality (Epstein, 1998), and, most applicable to this
current study, the theory of self-regulation (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996).
In addition (and complimentary) to the dual-process framework of executive function,
Miyake et al. proposed a model known as the Unity/Diversity Model, consisting of three separate
but correlated factors that comprise executive function. Those factors are mental set-shifting
(cognitive flexibility), inhibition of pre-potent responses (inhibitory control), and information
updating and monitoring (working memory capacity; Miyake et al., 2000). Miyake and Friedman
(2012) argue that individual differences within executive functions exhibit the following: (a)
both unity and diversity, in that different executive functions can be correlated but separated; (b)
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substantially genetically informed; (c) related to different clinical and societal behaviors; and (d)
demonstrate some developmental stability (p. 8). Most recently, Miyake and colleagues (2017)
have demonstrated evidence that within the Unity/Diversity Model of executive function,
inhibitory control may not be a discreet component of executive function, rather, it is more a
common executive function, and both working memory capacity and cognitive flexibility are
more specific executive function constructs that exist distinctly from the common executive
function.
Diamond et al. (2013) have proposed a model of executive function that corresponds to
and compliments both the Dual-Process and Unity/Diversity Models. From a developmental
perspective, Diamond traces the lifetime progression of the core executive functions: inhibition
and cognitive interference control, working memory, and cognitive flexibility. Diamond suggests
that inhibitory control involves the ability to control not only attention (control at the level of
perception as well as consciously choosing to ignore specific stimuli opposed to our goals) but
also interference control (suppressing unwanted thoughts or memories), behavior (self-control in
the forms of delay gratification, staying on task, delaying pre-potent responses, and “not acting
impulsively”), thoughts, and/or emotions (p.137).
For the present study, Miyake and Diamond’s model of the core factors of executive
function will be applied; thus, behavioral measures for the experimental study in this project will
reflect validated measures of cognitive flexibility (set-shifting), inhibition/cognitive interference
control, and working memory capacity (updating/monitoring). Although Miyake and Friedman’s
model is popular, and Diamond’s model is fairly recent, those models are certainly not the only
conceptions of the factor structure of this construct. To illustrate this literature, Table 1.1
summarizes some of the other popular theories of executive function.
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Table 1.1 Some Influential Models of Executive Function

Theorists
Luria (1966)
Norman & Shallice
(1980)

Theory

Supervisory
Attentional System

Stuss & Benson
(1986)
Daigneault, Braun, &
Whitaker (1992)

Denkla (1994)

Supervisory Attention System is the executive monitoring system
that controls contention scheduling and the activation of thought
and action schema.
Initiation, Planning, Sequencing, Organization, Regulation
Six components of pre-frontal or executive functions: planning,
execution, self-regulation, maintenance, spatiotemporal
segmentation, and sustained mental productivity.

Neuropsychological
Approach

Leezak (1995)

Borkowski &
Muthukrishna (1992)

Components
Anticipation, Planning, Execution, Self-Monitoring

Executive function is a set of domain-general control processes
that contain future tense aspects and should not be viewed as
hierarchically superior but central to cognitive operations. EF is
control processes for organization of behavior over time.
Volition (self-awareness and self-monitoring), planning,
purposive action, effective performance

Information
Processing

Executive Function, as the most important process within a
metacognition system, is comprised of task analysis, planfulness,
reflectivity, monitoring, and strategy revision. The three major
components of executive function are task analysis, strategy
control, and strategy monitoring. A fourth closely linked with
strategy selection is strategy revision.

Hayes, Gifford, &
Ruckstuhl, Jr. (1996)

Relational Frame
Theory

Executive function is the ability to derive, apply, or actually
follow verbal rules when they are in conflict with other verbal or
nonverbal sources of behavior. Verbal self-regulation is a key
component of executive function.

Barkley (1997)

Self-Regulatory
Model

EF comprises four main functions: working memory for
inhibitory control, control of inner speech, control of emotional
response, and reconstitution/behavior analysis. Executive
Response is a special case of “attending behavior.” Behaviors
that alter the likelihood of later events and behaviors.

Miyake & Friedman
(2000)

Unity and Diversity
theory

Three factors of executive function are updating, shifting, and
inhibition.

Borkowski & Burke
(1996)

Sohlberg & Mateer
(2001)

Initiation and drive, Response Inhibition (stopping behavior),
Task Persistence (maintaining behavior), organization,
generative thinking (cognitive flexibility), awareness
(monitoring)

Miller & Cohen
(2001)

Cognitive control biases sensory signals to promote task
appropriate response
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Keil & Kaszniak
(2002)

Planning, scheduling, strategy use, rule adherence, generation,
fluency, initiation, shifting, suppression, concept formation,
abstract reasoning

Zelazo & Muller
(2002)

Cognitive
Complexity and
Control

Functional construct; Executive Function can be understood as
development of application of rules to problem solving within
development of children. The components responsible for ability
to problem solve are problem definition, planning, execution, and
monitoring abilities.

Pennington (2002)

Neuropsychological

Executive Functions are neurocognitive processes, “top-down”
cognitive control, including working memory and executive
attention, that facilitate decision making by holding information
in working memory and maintaining an appropriate problemsolving set to accomplish a future goal.

Weibe, Espy, &
Charak (2008)

Banich (2009)

Executive function is a unitary, domain-general process in
preschool that develops in a sequence of working memory,
inhibition and then set-switching.
Cascade of Control

Sequential cascade of brain regions to maintain attention sets for
goal-directed behavior. Activation of one area depends upon
efficiency of the brain area activated prior.

Latzman & Markon
(2010)

Three factors from factor analysis of D-KEFS labeled Cognitive
Flexibility, Monitoring, and Inhibition, found in adolescent male
sample (age 11-16).

Diamond (2013)

The core components of executive function are Inhibition
(resisting temptations or acting impulsively) and Interference
Control (selective attention and cognitive inhibition), Working
Memory, and Cognitive Flexibility (adapting quickly to changing
circumstances and creatively thinking outside the box).

Friedman & Miyake
(2017)

As an adjustment to the Unity/Diversity Model, Executive
Function is comprised of two distinct factors of Updating
(WMC) and Shifting (Cognitive Flexibility), with a common EF
factor supporting (previously Inhibitory Control) them.

1.1.2.1 Working memory capacity and controlled attention. Miller, Galanter, and
Pribram (1960) coined the term “working memory” in Plan and Structure of Behavior when
discussing the human ability to chunk information using short-term memory while performing
planning tasks; however, their use of the term differed from current connotations. Baddeley and
Hitch (1973) proposed the theoretical construct of working memory to address phenomena not
accounted for by Atkinson and Shiffrin’s (1968) Modal Model of memory. Specifically, the
Modal Model of memory proposed three stages of memory: sensory memory, short-term
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memory, and long-term memory. Atkinson and Shiffrin proposed that these three memory
processes are strictly sequential: information must be first acquired through sensory memory and
processed in short-term memory in order to be encoded into long-term memory. Baddeley and
Hitch (1974) challenged this proposition with the finding that individuals could perform dual
tasks simultaneously with minimal performance decrements on either task, suggesting that
memory could simultaneously store and manipulate information. Baddeley and Hitch used the
term “working memory” to account for memory processes manipulating information in addition
to modality-specific short-term storage, defining it as a memory capacity system that “provides
temporary storage and manipulation of the information necessary for such complex tasks as
language comprehension, learning, and reasoning” (Baddeley, 1992, p. 556). Baddeley
subsequently proposed four components of the working memory system: a central executive,
phonological loop, visuospatial sketchpad, and the episodic buffer. Most relevant to the present
study, the central executive system was believed to be a mental faculty that regulates an
individual’s thoughts to achieve to task goals and controls recall of information from the “slave
systems” of the phonological loop and visuospatial sketchpad (Baddeley, 1986, 1996, 2000).
Cowan (1995, 1999) proposed that rather than existing as a separate structure from longterm memory, working memory works within the same system. In Cowan’s view, working
memory is simply the subset of long-term memory that is most active at any moment, rather than
separate representations within domain-specific storage units as was suggested by Baddeley.
These activated representations (which could be theoretically limitless in number, although
Cowan consistently reported the limits to be around four or five items) are retrieved or activated,
and can be maintained in active, conscious use by strategies (similar to skills suggested by
Baddeley within his “slave systems”). Cowan argued that if these strategies are not available or
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useful, or if there are environmental stimuli that threaten to compete for cognitive resources,
other traces may be activated, and the previously-activated representations become faded and
lost. Attention control, according to Cowan, could aid in maintaining access to the activated
memory traces, but could hold a limit of four chunks of information.
Of the various tasks attributed to the central executive system, the ability to control
lower-level processes that hold information, even during interference or distraction, would be
most applicable to this study, and has been identified as one of the more important functions of
working memory (Engle, 2002; Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; Norman & Shallice,
1986). This function is referred to as either working memory capacity or executive attention
(Engel, 2002) and can be understood as “the ability to control attention to maintain information
in an active, quickly retrievable state…Working Memory capacity is not directly about memory–
it is about using attention to maintain or suppress information” (Engel, 2002, p. 20). Current
models of working memory have assumed that the capacity is finite for each individual but that
individuals differ in this limit (Barrett, Tugade, & Engel, 2004). These individual differences in
working memory capacity have been implicated in performance on many higher-order cognitive
abilities, including: reading comprehension (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980); listening
comprehension (Daneman & Carpenter, 1983); vocabulary learning (Daneman & Green, 1986);
note-taking (Kiewra & Benton, 1988); following directions (Engel, Carullo & Collins, 1991);
language acquisition (Baddeley, 2003); language comprehension (King & Just, 1991); reasoning
(Barrouillet, 1996); non-verbal problem solving (Logie, Gilhooly, & Wynn, 1994); law
enforcement decision making in shooting behavior (Kleider, Parrott, & King, 2009); and
memory distortion component in hindsight bias (Calvillo, 2012). These differences have also
been found to be a strong predictor for fluid intelligence and executive functioning (Engle et al.,
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1999); although most recently, Engle et al. have proposed inhibitory control (executive attention)
reflects fluid intelligence and working memory capacity reflects maintenance of information.
(Engle et al., 2018).
Barratt, Tugade, and Engle (2004) discussed the role of attention control within the dualprocess model and described individual differences in working memory capacity as the source of
goal-directed attention. Barratt et al. suggest that working memory capacity is the capability to
hold information in an active state while concurrently engaging in planful search of memory and
retrieval of pertinent task-relevant information. Therefore, individual differences in working
memory capacity can account for the variations in the ability to control or override automatic
working memory capacity; controlled attention compliments Posner’s theory of cognitive control
as an executive attention control, affecting both selective attention and inhibitory control of
attention.
Most recently, Engel (2018) has updated his original interpretation of results regarding
the relationship between working memory capacity and fluid intelligence. Currently, Engel
suggests working memory capacity reflects ability to maintain information, and fluid intelligence
reflects the ability to disregard or disengage irrelevant information. Both of these abilities rely
heavily on an individual’s ability to control attention, and this common dependence on attention
control is what led to conflation of working memory capacity and fluid intelligence in previous
studies. Engel’s updated model is complimentary to Miyake’s Unity/Diversity model in that
inhibitory control (or as he now refers as common executive function) combined with the other
distinct and specific executive functions underlies all complex executive functions (i.e.,
planning). Both Engel and Miyake are claiming attention control is a common factor in working
memory, fluid intelligence and executive function constructs.
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1.1.3.1 Working memory capacity and self-regulatory behavior. Within the context of
Norman and Shallice’s (1986) dual-process model of executive functioning, Barratt et al. (2004)
considered contributions of working memory capacity to self-regulation and posited three
potential mechanisms through which individual differences in controlled attention may manifest
in variations of self-control. First, working memory capacity (attention control) appears to be
related to tolerance of ambiguity, such that individuals with lower capacity might be unable to
tolerate uncertainty of future events and, thus, may impulsively make a poor decision to end the
uncertainty rather than evaluate multiple possible outcomes (pp .21-22). In other words, an
individual with lower working memory capacity may, when given multiple options, make a
quick (or impulsive) decision without adequately assessing all possible choices because of an
inability to tolerate uncertainty. Barratt et al. (2001) speculate that the cognitive load placed upon
one by the experience of uncertainty would be costly to an individual with low working memory
capacity; in fact, the experience could impede the individual from correctly evaluating the value
of future choice. One possible application of this mechanism to consumer behavior may be the
ability to evaluate short-term versus long-term reward of purchases. Additionally, set-switching
or cognitive flexibility (one of the core EF components proposed by both Miyake and Diamond)
could account for the ability (or inability) to evaluate successfully two options (short-term and
long-term rewards), as an individual who struggles with flexibility may find switching between
two types of rewards difficult.
In the second mechanism discussed by Barratt et al. (2004), working memory capacity
assists an individual’s ability to resist attentional capture, allowing attention to be sustained via
executive, goal-oriented control to the appropriate stimuli rather than to salient distractors. In a
consumer-behavior context, these potent distractor stimuli might include advertising strategies
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aimed at consumers. Considering most definitions of impulsive consumer behavior indicate a
component of exposure to stimuli, this mechanism discussed by Barratt et al. (2004) may account
for a large part of self-control issues within impulsive purchasing.
Third, Barratt et al. (2004) suggested that working memory capacity may influence the
ability to override or suppress classically-conditioned affective associations that are no longer
efficient, optimal, or appropriate—at least at that moment. Marketing professionals certainly
recognize the value of classical and operant conditioning in purchasing decisions and so select
colors for packaging, images for advertising, celebrities for endorsement, and so forth to increase
motivation and build purchasing habits, both of which would require effortful processing to
inhibit (DiClemente & Hantula, 2003; De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001; Gorn, 1982;
McSweeney & Bierely, 1984).
Several studies have suggested that deficits in the executive control system or central
executive system of working memory can at least partially account for the cognitive deficits and
self-regulatory problems in highly-impulsive individuals (e.g., Finn, Justus, Mazas, & Steinmetz,
1999; Stanford, Greve, & Gerstle, 1997; Villemarette-Pittman, Stanford, & Greve, 2003).
However, the definitions of executive control differed among these studies, as different measures
of executive attention/control were used. For example, Finn and collaborators (1999) used the
Digit Span Task of the Weschler Adult Intelligence Test, Revised (WAIS-R; Weschler, 1981)
and Conditional Associations Task (CAT; Petrides, 1981). In comparison, Stanford and
collaborators operationalized executive control as Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Heaton,
Challun, Talley, Kay & Curtis, 1993), design fluency test (Jones, Gottman, & Milner, 1977), and
Trail Making Test (Reitan, 1958).
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In testing a theory that working memory and conditional associative learning modulate
behavioral inhibition, Finn et al. (1999) used a Go/No-Task with a contingency reversal (adapted
from Newman & Kosson, 1986). The task involved serial representation on a computer screen
(750ms) of eight different two-digit numerical stimuli (four no/go and four go). After the tenth
block, contingency reversal took place; i.e., the stimuli that were previously “go” became
“no/go” and vice versa. Finn et. al. (1999) demonstrated that individuals with low working
memory capacity (digits backward of Digit Span Task) and low conditional associative learning
(Conditional Associations Task) exhibited more errors of commission after contingency reversal
(a measure of impulsivity) and predicted success of learning to inhibit behavior after contingency
reversal. Furthermore, they found that individuals with low WMC were more susceptible to the
effects of alcohol on increasing impulsive behavior, as measured with the Go/No-Go task.
In order to parcel specific factors of executive control related to impulsiveness, Witney,
Jameson, and Hinson (2004) predicted impulsiveness (as measured by the Barratt Impulsiveness
Scale; BIS-11), from various different measures of executive control, including a new measure
of memory scanning. The results of their work demonstrated that significant amounts of variance
in impulsiveness can be accounted for by individual differences in central executive control.
Further, and more important, a global measure for either executive control or impulsiveness may
not adequately convey the complicated relation between the two constructs, as the authors found
that the subtypes of impulsivity are related to different subtypes or component factors of
executive control. The three subtypes or subscales of impulsivity identified within the BIS are
the following: Attentional (“I concentrate easily” or “I don’t ‘pay attention’”), Non-Planning (“I
plan trips well ahead of time” or “I act on the spur of the moment”), and Motor (“I am restless in
a movie theater” or “I squirm at plays or lectures”). Overall, working memory capacity and
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cognitive inhibition (deleting or ignoring irrelevant information) significantly predicted overall
impulsiveness. However, higher scores on the attentional impulsiveness subscale were associated
with the inability to delete irrelevant or no-longer-relevant information, but attentional
impulsiveness was not related to working memory capacity. In addition, non-planning
impulsiveness was predicted by working memory capacity but showed no significant relation to
inhibition of interference. Finally, higher scores on the motor impulsivity subscale were
associated with lower overall capacity and a greater ability to inhibit interference.
Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, and Schmitt (2008) tested the relation of working
memory capacity (using a computation span task) on self-regulatory behavior, operationalized as
sexual interest behavior, consumption of tempting food, and expression of anger. Summarizing
the previous literature (Carver, 2005; Hofmann, Rauch & Gawronski, 2007; Strack & Deutsch,
2004), Hoffman et al. (2008) argued that self-regulatory behavior was ultimately the product of a
conflict between automatic and controlled processing systems. Consequently, they reasoned that
individuals with greater working memory capacity should have greater resources to devote to the
controlled system, allowing for more successful self-regulatory behavior. The authors
demonstrated that the relation between working memory capacity and self-regulatory behavior
was more complex than a direct correlation; rather, they argued that working memory capacity
moderates the relation between automatic (i.e., temptations, urges, arousal, impulses) and
controlled (i.e., goals, implementation intentions, incentive) precursors and behavior, suggesting
higher working memory capacity allows for more capacity to hold long-term goals and shield
those goals from interference, particularly from automatic processing (i.e., impulses).
Hinson, Jameson, and Witney (2003) suggested a reinterpretation of findings such as
these. They argued that the effects of working memory capacity on decision making were
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reflective of problems in evaluating reward magnitude and, I propose, perhaps future
consequences. In situations where cognitive demands are high, or in which individuals have
deficits in working memory capacity, an immediately-available reward may be overvalued
relative to a delayed reward because the individual lacks the resources to properly evaluate the
displayed reward. Thus, a behavior that appears impulsive (select the smaller-sooner reward
rather than the larger-later) may, in fact, be a reasonable decision based on distorted evaluations
of reward magnitudes (the immediate reward is overvalued, and/or the delayed reward is
undervalued). Referencing the Delay-Discounting (DD) paradigm, Hinson et. al. (2003)
suggested that, in situations where either high cognitive load is present or where an individual
has deficits in working memory capacity, an immediately-available reward might be overvalued
because the individual cannot evaluate a delayed reward properly due to limited available
cognitive resources. As working memory capacity is utilized in a large variety of contexts, the
impulsive decision strategy may appear as a personality trait, identified by standardized
measures of impulsivity like the BIS-11 (Barratt, 1994). Supporting this interpretation, Hinson
et. al. (2003) demonstrated that Delay-Discounting performance is related to working memory
capacity. When manipulating cognitive load, an increase in load predicted increases in impulsive
decisions in delay discounting (choice of immediate reward over delayed reward), and individual
differences in BIS-11 and self-report dysexecutive questionnaires were also strongly related to
delay-discounting performance.
Reimers, Maylor, Stewart and Chater (2009) reported associations between delay
discounting and real-world impulsive behavior. Using single delay-discounting choice and selfreport measures of a large sample (N=42,863), Reimers and collaborators reported correlations
between smaller-sooner choice in delay discounting and several impulsive behaviors: initial
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sexual activity, recent relationship infidelity, smoking, and higher body mass index. Associations
between smaller-sooner choice and demographic variables (younger age, lower income, and
lower education) were also found. Their results suggest an underlying cognitive reason (like low
working memory capacity) for performance on delay discounting carries into real-world
decisions and behavior.
1.1.3.2 Measuring executive function. Spinella (2005a) developed an instrument for selfrating of executive function within normal populations, called the Executive Function Index
(EFI). The EFI consists of five subscales (five components determined through factor analysis to
account for the majority of variance): motivational drive, strategic planning, organization,
impulse control, and empathy. It was created as an efficient means to gather data from large
samples for testing hypotheses regarding prefrontal systems and behavior as well as to bolster
findings with behavioral tests and functional neuroimaging. The EFI was found to correlate with
other self-reported executive functioning measures, including the Frontal Systems Behavior
Scale (FrSBe), Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS), and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI;
Spinella, 2005). Although the EFI may correlate with other self-report measures (FrSBE, BIS,
and IRI) that have been validated, the EFI has not, to this author’s knowledge, been tested for
correlation with behavioral measures of executive function (Carvallho, Ready, Malloy, Grace,
2103; Fernandez, Duffey, Kramp, 2009; Gillet, Mela, Studer, 2013; Neimeier, Perrin, Holcomb,
Nerssessova, & Rolston, 2013; Stanford, Mathias, Dougherty, Lake, Anderson, & Patton, 2009;
Siu & Sheck, 2005). However, Spinella (2005) contends that the EFI strongly correlates with
other self-report executive function measures that have been validated through either clinical,
experimental, or neuroimaging studies. If, as is proposed in this study, aspects of executive
function—specifically cognitive flexibility, inhibitory control, and working memory capacity—
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affect or moderate an individual’s purchasing behavior, it must be confirmed that the EFI
successfully measures those aspects. To implement the EFI successfully as a measure in a larger
survey for modeling consumer behavior, a study should demonstrate and validate which
behavioral measures of executive function are accounted for with the EFI.
Since the development of the EFI, the measure has been used in at least three studies.
O’Wain and Spinella (2007) found consistent positive correlations between moral attitudes and
all subscales within the EFI, independent of demographics, as well as small positive correlations
between traditional religious beliefs, empathy, and impulse control. In addition, measures of
gratitude and satisfaction were found to be positively correlated with EFI results, while impulse
control and forgiveness were negatively correlated within college students (Miley & Spinella,
2006). More recently, Rabin, Fogel and Nutter-Upham (2010) found the EFI significantly
predicted, in addition to age and lower conscientiousness, academic procrastination within
college students.
1.1.3

Personality

1.1.3.1 Measures of impulsivity: Eysenck Personality Inventory and Questionnaire.
References to impulsivity within individuals can be first attributed to Plato, who wrote, “Quick
intelligence, memory, sagacity, cleverness, and similar qualities, do not often grow together, and
...persons who possess them and are at the same time high-spirited and magnanimous are not so
constituted by nature as to live in an orderly and peaceful and settled manner; they are driven any
way by their impulses, and all solid principle goes out of them” (Plato, c. 503, p. ). Hippocrates
(ca. 460 BC-370 BC) discussed impulsivity as a phenomenon of temperament, and Galen (AD
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129-ca. AD 200) followed within his theory of personality based on four bodily fluids. Impulsive
nature was considered an aspect of the Choleric personality type.
It was Eysenck’s (1947) theory that first introduced the construct of impulsiveness to
modern psychology within the individual differences framework. In the Eysenck Personality
Inventory (EPI), Eysenck first proposed the construct of impulsivity as one trait (or theoretical
construct comprising statistically-related habitual responses) of several that explained
extraversion (Moeller, 2012). Impulsivity comprised of four habits, the first being “impulsivity
narrow,” which is similar to motor impulsiveness (Stanford & Patton, 2012) and can be defined
as responding rapidly without adequate evaluation of the situational context or outcomes
(Hamilton et. al., 2015). Eysenck identified three additional habits: non-planning (acting without
prior planning), liveliness (motor impulsivity), and risk-taking. However, when psychoticism
was included as a personality trait in the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ; 1975), the
factor “impulsivity narrow” loaded on psychoticism rather than extroversion, while the other
three (non-planning, liveliness, and risk-taking) loaded on extroversion (Action, 2003; Whiteside
& Lynam, 2001). Thus, Eysenck moved the term impulsiveness to psychoticism and organized
the other factors under “venturesomeness” within extroversion. This movement of impulsivity as
a component of psychoticism rather than extroversion reflected a difference in approach from
individual differences to more clinical perspectives, specifically suggesting impulsiveness as
dysfunctional (Moeller, 2012).
1.1.3.2 Measures of impulsivity: Barratt Impulsivity Scale. Barratt (1959) made a
significant contribution to the study of impulsiveness when he created a measure of
impulsiveness known as the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS). Barratt hypothesized that the two
constructs of anxiety and impulsiveness were orthogonal and created the first version of the BIS
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with a goal of eliminating items that correlated with measures of anxiety (Stanford et al., 2009).
In later versions of the BIS (Patton & Stanford, 1995; Stanford et al., 2009; Steinberg, Sharp,
Stanford, & Tharp, 2013), Barratt suggested impulsivity as a multidimensional construct defined
as the following: “a predisposition toward rapid, unplanned reactions to internal or external
stimuli without regard to the negative consequences of these reactions to the impulsive
individual or to others” (Moeller, Barratt, Dougherty, Schmitz, & Swann, 2001, p. 1784).
Over 40 years, Barratt created and refined the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale to the current
eleventh version (BIS-11), which has become the most widely-administered self-report measure
of impulsiveness in both research and clinical settings (Stanford et al., 2009). The current version
contains three subscales: non-planning impulsivity, attentional impulsivity, and motor
impulsivity. This version has been cited over 3,700 times as of 2016. Within these many
citations, the BIS-11 has been used to identify high levels of impulsiveness in adults related to
cocaine dependency (Lane, Moeller, Steinberg, Buzby, & Kosten, 2007) and Ecstasy abuse
(Bond, Verheyden, Wingrove, & Curran, 2004). Studies have identified a relationship between
mood disorders and high scores on the BIS-11 (Peluso, Hatch, Glahn, Monkul, Sanches, & Najt,
2007). High levels of impulsiveness on the BIS-11 have also been found for individuals
diagnosed with ADHD (Malloy-Diniz, Fuentes, Leite, Correa, & Bechara, 2007) as well as for
pathological gamblers (Rodriguez-Jimenez, Jimenez-Arriero, Ponce, Monsor, & Jimenez, 2006),
and has been correlated with tobacco use (Spinella, 2002b). In addition, BIS-11 scores have been
related to right frontal white matter structure in schizophrenic patients (Hoptman, Volavka,
Johnson, Weiss, Bilder, & Lim, 2002).
More specific to the topic of the present study, the BIS-11 has contributed significantly
to the individual differences perspective on impulsive behavior. The three subtraits of the current
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BIS-11 are defined as follows: motor impulsiveness is acting without thinking, non-planning
impulsiveness involves a lack of forethought, and attentional impulsiveness is an inability to
focus attention or to concentrate (Barratt, 1985). Within normal populations, high levels of
impulsiveness measured on the BIS-11 have been associated with reduced behavioral inhibition
(Potts, George, Martin, & Barratt, 2005) and increased sensitivity to reward (Martin & Potts,
2004). In addition, Levine, Waite, and Bowman (2007) found BIS-11 scores to be significantly
correlated with academic distractibility.
Coutlee, Politzer, Hoyle, and Huettel (2014) updated the BIS-11 by using factor analysis
to eliminate 17 items of the BIS-11 that measured impulsiveness poorly and that did not reflect
behaviors applicable to modern culture. The updated version, Abbreviated Impulsiveness Scale
(ABIS), was found to be efficient and consistent at measuring aspects of impulsiveness with just
13 items, while maintaining the three subscales refined in BIS-11 (attentional, motor, and
nonplanning). In additional testing by Coutlee et al. (2014), the ABIS was successful at
predicting alcohol consumption.
1.1.3.3 Measures of impulsivity: Cognitive tasks. Halperin, Newcorn, Sharma, Healey,
Wolf, and Pascualvaca (1990) argued that differences in performance (specifically, commission
errors) on a continuous performance task (CPT) to measure vigilance between diagnosed ADHD
children and control could aid in understanding the role of impulsiveness in ADHD populations.
Studies have subsequently confirmed the pattern, with more commission errors in CPT among
adults with substance abuse (Moeller et. al., 2005), adults with bipolar disorder (Swann,
Pazzaglia, Nicholls, Dougherty, & Moeller; 2003), and children with conduct disorders
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(Dougherty, Marsh, & Mathias, 2002)—in each case, clinical groups known to exhibit impulsive
behavior.
Logan, Schachar, and Tannock (1997) proposed the behavioral measure of a Go/Stop task
as means to identify and define impulsivity, arguing that impulsive individuals would have
difficulties inhibiting prepotent responses. Subsequently, Pliszka, Borcherding, Spratley, Leon,
and Irick (1997) demonstrated impaired performance on Go/Stop task in children diagnosed with
ADHD, a population known to exhibit impulsivity. In more recent years, a variation of Go/Stop
task, known as Go/No-Go task, has been used as a behavioral measure of impulsivity (Helmers,
Young, & Pihl, 1995) and assesses the ability of an individual to inhibit responding to a stimulus
previously associated with either a reward or punishment. Iaboni, Douglas, and Baker (1995)
found children diagnosed with ADHD not only to make more errors of commission, but also
more errors of omission on trials of stimuli previously paired with reward. While investigating
the relationship between executive control function and interpersonal aggressive behavior,
Hoaken, Shaughnessy, and Pihl (2003) used a Go/No-Go discrimination task to measure
impulsiveness in individuals. They concluded that individuals with low executive control were
more likely to show higher levels of impulsivity (as measured by errors of commission in
Go/No-Go) and were more aggressive, as measured by Taylor Aggression Paradigm (TAP;
Taylor, 1967).
1.1.3.4 Impulsivity and executive function. Chesung, Mitsis, and Halperin (2004)
demonstrated BIS-11 scores to be associated with cognitive flexibility and intelligence, as
measured by the Wisconsin Card Sort Test and WAIS-11. That same year, Witney, Jameson, and
Hinson (2004) reported that subtypes of impulsivity were related to the executive control of
working memory. The ability to control attention has also been identified as an important factor
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in an individual’s ability to delay gratification (Peake, Hebl, & Mischel, 2002; Rodriquez,
Mischel, & Shoda, 1989), and, as described in the section above on working memory capacity,
low ability in executive attention is associated with a larger impact of impulsiveness on selfregulatory behavior (Hofmann et al., 2008).
In an effort to infer the neurobehavioral correlates of impulsivity, Spinella (2004) tested
relationships between impulsivity (BIS-11) and behavioral measures that have been previously
associated with prefrontal function (e.g., Go/No-Go, antisaccade, and delayed alternation). The
results indicated significant correlations between Go/No-Go and antisaccade performance with
impulsivity (BIS-11) and a negative correlation between delayed alternation DAL (correct
responses) and impulsiveness. Spinella argued that because the behavioral measures used in this
study have previously demonstrated sensitivity to prefrontal function, these findings suggest a
role of the prefrontal cortex and associated subcortical structures in impulsivity, thus offering
additional validation of the BIS-11.
As discussed earlier, Spinella (2005) also used the EFI subscales to identify specific
aspects of executive function related to impulsiveness. He found that the Strategic Planning
Subscale significantly correlated (negatively) with the BIS-11 Non-planning Impulsiveness
subscale. Furthermore, EFI’s Impulse Control subscale, which reflects self-inhibition, negatively
correlated with the BIS-11 Motor Impulsiveness subscale.
1.1.3.5 Big-five personality model. The Five-Factor Model of personality is arguably the
most comprehensive personality trait model currently used in psychological research (MacRae &
Costa, 1987). Goldberg (1993) recounted the history of development of the Five-Factor Model,
starting with Galton’s (1884) “lexicon hypothesis,” leading to the development of the Thurstone
Temperament Schedule (Thurstone, 1953), which identified seven factors of personality. Tupes
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and Christal (1958, 1961) analyzed results from studies using Cattell’s (1943) 35 bipolar
variables and identified five factors. They are credited with first introducing what is now known
as the “Big 5” model of personality. As described by Goldberg (1993), these five broad factors
should be viewed in a hierarchical model in which hundreds of personality traits are organized
under the five domains. Factor One (Extraversion/Introversion) is characterized by talkativeness,
assertiveness, or silence, passivity, and reserve. Factor Two (Neuroticism/Emotional Stability)
includes traits of moodiness, anxiety, impulsiveness, and vulnerability. Factor Three (Openness
to Experience) contrasts traits of imagination, intellectual curiosity, and creativity with traits of
shallowness and imperceptiveness. Factor Four (Conscientiousness) incorporates traits of
orderliness, reliability, and deliberateness. Factor Five (Agreeableness) contrasts traits of trust,
kindness, straightforwardness, and compliance with hostility, selfishness, and distrust.
(Goldberg, 1993).
The Big-5 Personality model has been used to demonstrate relations between personality
traits and various behaviors. Most relevant to the present study, Pirog and Roberts (2007), using
the Meta-theoretic Model of Motivation (3M) Framework (Mowen, 2000), identified
relationships between personality traits of neuroticism (emotional instability), introversion,
conscientiousness, materialism, and need for arousal with credit card misuse in college students.
Interestingly, all of the relationships were mediated by impulsiveness, with the relationship of
materialism and need for arousal predicting credit card misuse fully mediated by impulsiveness
(Pirog & Roberts, 2007).
In an effort to gain understanding of the construct of impulsivity, Whiteside and Lynam
(2001) used factor analysis on the five-factor model and four self-report measures of
impulsiveness (BIS-11, Dickman’s Dysfunctional and Functional Scale, EASI-111, and I-7
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Impulsiveness Questionnaire). The authors identified four facets of impulsivity that “are not
considered variations of impulsivity but rather discrete psychological processes that lead to
impulsive-like behavior” (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001, p. 685). The four facets—urgency, (lack
of) premeditation, (lack of) perseverance, and sensation-seeking—showed differing relationships
with the five factors of personality. Whiteside and Lynam argued that these four facets are, in
fact, separate features of personality that have been mistakenly blended under the larger
“umbrella term of impulsivity” (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001, p. 684).
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2
2.1

STUDY 1

Study Purpose
The purpose for this study is to answer the following questions: First, what is the relation

between personality, impulsive consumer behavior, and executive function, as measured by selfreport? Second, what is the relation between personality traits, impulsive consumer behavior, and
executive function, as measured by standard cognitive assessments? Finally, what is the relation
between self-reported executive function and standard cognitive assessments of executive
function? To answer these questions, Study 1 consisted of two large, complementary surveys
with self-report measures (Study 1A and 1B) of consumer behavior, and Study 2 utilized survey
methodology with both self-report and behavioral measures, as well as a purchasing task.
2.2

Study 1, Part A
2.2.1

Methods

Participants (N=6,122) were recruited to complete an online survey administered through
Survey Sampling, Inc. (SSI), selected from their existing panel of 4.1 million adult residents in
the United States. Recruitment was conducted by SSI sending an email to their existing panel
with an invitation to participate. All members of their panel were given said opportunity and
allowed to refuse if wanted. SSI compensated participants in a manner commensurate with all
other surveys available to their existing panel and informed subjects in advance that participation
was voluntary and could be discontinued at any point within the survey with no penalty. The
survey was administered to the general population of the SSI panel, with no limitations placed on
screens, with the exception of a minimum age requirement of 18 years old. All participants
completed the survey anonymously and were informed in advance that any answers would be
reported in aggregate with other respondents. As part of the contract with SSI, personally-
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identifiable information was not and will not be released to the investigator of this study. The
demographics of the SSI panel consist of the following: 50% females, 49% males, and 1%
transgender, and broad ranges in age (ages 18 to 94 years), education levels (less than high
school graduate to doctoral level), and socio-economic status. Ethnicity/race information was not
reported within this dataset, but the SSI national sample is described as representative of the
population. Approval to analyze these datasets was obtained by Georgia State University
Institutional Review Board, which ensures the ethical treatment of human subjects.
2.2.2

Apparatus, Measures and Procedure

All surveys were administered via SSI. An email invitation was sent to existing panel
members inviting them to participate in a survey. Survey questions were administered via panel
members’ personal computer, electronic tablet, or mobile device. After obtaining demographic
information, including age, gender, and education level, the following tests self-report measures
were administered in the same order:
2.2.2.1 Executive function. As discussed in Chapter 1, the Executive Function Index is a
self-report questionnaire that purports to measure Executive Function on five subscales:
Motivational Drive, Strategic Planning, Organization, Impulse Control, and Empathy. The
questionnaire contains 27 items that load on the five subscales. Items are rated on a 5-point
Likert scale. Items are listed in Appendix A. As of the writing of his study, reliability and
internal consistency estimates have not been published.
2.2.2.2 Credit card misuse. Credit card misuse was measured using a 12-item, five-point
Likert scale developed by Roberts and Jones (2001). Individuals with higher scale scores could
be viewed as being less responsible in the use of their credit cards. The scale exhibited good
internal consistency (a = .78) in a previous study (Omar, Sainz, Rahim, Che Wel, & Shah,
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2014). A list of scale items is provided in Appendix B.
2.2.2.3 Impulsiveness. The Brief Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-8) is an 8-item selfreport instrument designed to assess the construct of impulsiveness (Stanford et al., 2009). The
BIS-8 version utilized in this study identifies first-order factors of attention, motor, self-control,
cognitive complexity, perseverance, and cognitive instability. Second-order factors of attention
impulsivity, motor impulsivity, and non-planning are additionally identified. Internal validity for
the total BIS-8 is .83 (Stanford et al, 2009). A list of items is provided in Appendix C.
2.2.2.4 Five-factor personality measure. The Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) was
used to gain a measure of the Big Five personality dimensions. This instrument was designed to
offer a brief version of the larger Big Five Index with each item representing one pole of the
Five-Factor Model dimensions. Mean test-retest reliability for the overall measure is .80, with
each factor test-retest reliability as the following: Extraversion .82, Openness to Experience .80,
Agreeableness .76, Conscientiousness .76, and Emotional Stability .81 (Gosling, Rentfrow, &
Swann Jr., 2003). Items are listed in Appendix D.
2.2.2.5 Spending and value seeking. Nine items were asked in a previous survey
designed for consumer research (N=6,037) to identify types of consumer behavior. An EFA was
performed to identify factors of consumer behavior. Internal consistency for this measure was
considered good (a=.88). A principal components exploratory factor analysis was performed to
identify factors of consumer behavior. Promax rotation was used, and no limitation of number of
factors was placed. Two factors emerged, which were titled Spending (S) and Value Seeking
(VS). These two factors accounted for 76.83% of the total variability (spending, 32.38%; value
seeking, 44.45%). These questions and their factor loadings were the following:
•

I frequently search for values and coupons (.78 VS);
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•

I never pay for anything full price (.71 VS);

•

Researching for lower prices and ways to save money is something I do frequently (.79
VS);

•

I typically wait for a sale to purchase something (.78 VS);

•

I don’t spend money unless I feel I am getting a really good deal (.65 VS);

•

I buy things I don’t really need (-.81S);

•

I spend more money than I can afford (-.82 S);

•

If I want something, I buy it whether I can afford it or not (-.75 S);

•

I don’t really consider my budget when I really want to buy something (-.86 S).

2.3

Results
2.3.1

Measure Assessments

2.3.1.1 Impulsivity. A principal components exploratory factor analysis was used to
identify factor loadings and structure for the eight items in the Brief Barratt Impulsivity Scale
used in these studies. Promax rotation was used, as items were assumed, from previous theory
and knowledge of the scale, to be correlated. No limitation on the number of factors were set.
Two factors were identified and subsequently titled Impulse Action (40.97%) and Impulse Plan
(30.87%), and together accounted for 71.83% total variance. Four items loaded for each factor as
follows:
•

I plan tasks carefully (.82, IP);

•

I do things without thinking (.88, IA);

•

I don’t “pay attention” (.84, IA);

•

I am self-controlled (.81, IP);

•

I concentrate easily (.84, IP);
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•

I am a careful thinker (.864, IP);

•

I say things without thinking (.8, IA);

•

I act on the spur of the moment (.84, IA).

2.3.1.2 Preliminary and bivariate analyses. Descriptive statistics were calculated for all
the variables. A correlational analysis (Appendix E) was generated for age, all subscale measures
of the EFI (MD, SP, IC, EM, ORG), credit card misuse, value seeking, and spending behavior.
Age was moderately correlated with subscales of the Executive Function Index (impulse control,
r = -.44; organization, r = -.41) and credit-card misuse (r = .41). Consequently, age was
controlled for as a covariate in subsequent analyses. Group comparisons between gender groups
on all measures of EFI (subscales and total EFI) and on measures of consumer behavior
indicated no significant differences (p > .10), so gender was not controlled for or otherwise
considered in the subsequent analyses.
After confirmation of normality of distribution of the variables, zero-order correlational
analysis (Appendix E) was used to identify relations between the variables of the executive
function index (EFI), the five-factor personality inventory (TIPI), impulsiveness, credit-card
misuse, value-seeking, and spending. All of the variables were found to correlate significantly
with each other, but this result was expected, given the large sample used. Some correlations
were moderate to strong: EFI strategic planning with credit card misuse r(6122) = .53, p < .001;
EFI impulse control with credit card misuse, r(6122) = .54, p<.001; EFI organization with credit
card misuse, r(6122) = .51, p < .001; EFI organization with Impulse Action, r(6211)=.57, p <
.001; EFI Impulse Control with Impulse Action, r(6211)=.57, p <. 001; and EFI organization
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with impulsive consumer behavior, r(6211)=.53, p < .001. All additional correlations were weak
(between -.4 and .4) at best, even though most were statistically significant.
Clearly, there are many interesting ways that these data could be analyzed further.
However, the focus of the present project was on relations to consumer behavior, and thus those
are the questions that will be addressed here. In addition to examining the component measures,
an overall composite score for impulsive consumer behavior was created by first reverse-scoring
the value-seeking items, and then averaging the overall (reversed) score for value seeking with
the total scores for spending and credit card misuse measures. Consequently, higher scores on the
composite consumer behavior score reflects more spending and credit card misuse, together with
less value-seeking. Extreme groups for the composite consumer behavior measure were
identified as high, average, and low, using approximately top 10% as high and approximately
bottom 10% as low, with the remaining 80% as average. For the Impulsive Consumer Behavior
measure, approximately 10% of participants were considered to have High Impulsive Consumer
Behavior (N=616; range 4.86 to 7). Approximately 10% of participants were considered to have
Low Impulsive Consumer Behavior (N=593; range 1 to 2.36), and the remaining 80% were
considered to have average Impulsive Consumer Behavior. The large sample size allowed for
adequate group sizes to focus this extreme-groups comparison on the top and bottom 10% of
scores. In the two extreme groups, ages were evenly distributed in both groups. The Low
Impulsive Consumer group was composed of 56% male, 43% female, 1% transgender; mean age
of 46.63. The High Impulsive Consumer group was composed of 59% male, 41% female, 1%
transgender; mean age of 33.64. To adjust for multiple comparisons, all subsequent analyses
were only considered significant if a p-value measured less than .001. In addition, in all
subsequent analyses within this study, age is identified and controlled for as a covariate.
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A series of one-way ANCOVAs were performed to compare the means of all subscales of
the EFI between high and low groups of impulsive consumer behavior, while controlling for the
covariate age. Significant differences between high and low impulsive consumer behavior groups
were observed in EFI impulse control, F(1,1208)=1183.72, p < .001, ƞ2=.507, and EFI
organization, F(1,1208)=1239.75, p < .001, ƞ2=.495. Individuals with higher impulsive consumer
behavior scored lower in EFI Organization and Impulse Control, as evidenced in Table 2.1. No
significant differences were observed between the extreme groups in EFI strategic planning,
motivational drive, or empathy (see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 EFI and High vs. Low Impulsive Consumer Behavior Groups
(*p < .001)
Motivational Drive

Impulsive Consumer
Behavior
Low
High

Mean

Std. Error

3.388
3.649

.029
.028

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
3.332
3.444
3.594
3.704

Organization*

Low
High

3.839
2.135

.035
.034

3.771
2.068

3.907
2.201

Strategic Planning

Low
High

3.306
3.760

.025
.024

3.257
3.713

3.354
3.808

Impulse Control*

Low
High

3.709
2.125

.033
.032

3.644
2.062

3.773
2.189

Empathy

Low
High

3.640
3.891

.029
.028

3.584
3.836

3.696
3.946

A series of one-way ANCOVAs were also performed to compare means of all five
measures of personality (openness, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and
extroversion) between high and low groups of impulsive consumer behavior. There were
significant differences between high and low impulsive consumer behavior for conscientiousness
F(1,1208) = 263.89, p < .001, ƞ2=.179, but not the other measures of personality (see Table 2.2).
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Table 2.2 Personality Measure and High vs. Low Impulse Consumer Behavior Groups
(*p < .001)
Neuroticism

Impulsive Consumer
Behavior
Low
High

Mean

Std. Error

5.990
7.748

.098
.096

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
5.797
6.183
7.559
7.938

Openness

Low
High

9.636
8.872

.095
.093

9.450
8.689

9.822
9.054

Conscientiousness*

Low
High

11.209
8.896

.102
.100

11.010
8.700

11.409
9.092

Agreeableness

Low
High

10.019
8.651

.092
.090

9.838
8.474

10.199
8.828

Extroversion

Low
High

7.872
8.161

.102
.100

7.672
7.965

8.071
8.356

One-way ANCOVAs demonstrated a significant difference between high and low
impulsive consumer behavior groups on Impulse Action, F(1,1209) = 749.40, p < .001, ƞ2 = .383,
indicating those who scored highest in impulsive consumer behavior were significantly higher in
BIS-8 motor impulsiveness than those who were lower in impulsive consumer behavior. No
significant differences between high and low consumer behavior groups was seen for Impulse
Plan were identified (see Table 2.3).

Table 2.3 Impulsivity and High vs. Low Impulsive Consumer Behavior Groups
(*p < .001)
Impulse action*

Impulse plan

Impulsive Consumer
Behavior
Low
High
Low
High

Mean

Std. Error

2.128
3.634

.039
.039

2.361
1.923

.037
.037

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
2.051
2.205
3.559
3.710
2.288
1.851

2.434
1.995
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2.4

Study 1, Part B
2.4.1

Methods

Participants (N=6,000) were recruited, as in Study 1 Part A, to complete an online survey
administered through Survey Sampling, Inc. (SSI) to their existing panel of 4.1 million residents
in the United States. Recruitment was conducted by SSI providing an email with details for the
study to their existing panel. SSI compensated participants in a manner commensurate with all
other surveys available to their existing panel. Volunteers were informed in advance that
participation was voluntary and could be discontinued at any point within the survey with no
penalty. The survey was administered to the general population of the SSI panel, with no
limitations placed on screens, with the exception of a minimum age requirement of 18 years old.
All participants completed the survey anonymously and were informed in advance that any
answers would be reported in aggregate with other respondents. As part of the contract with SSI,
no personally-identifiable information was or will be delivered to the author of this study. The
demographics of the SSI panel consist of the following: 50% females, 49% males, and 1%
transgender, and broad ranges in age (ages 18 to 96 years; mean 44 years old), education levels
(less than high school graduate to doctoral level), and socio-economic status. Ethnicity/race
information was not provided in this dataset. Approval was obtained by Georgia State University
Institutional Review Board to analyze this archival dataset.
2.4.2

Apparatus and Measures

All apparatus and measures were repeated from Study 1, Part A, with the addition of two
consumer-behavior measures of Opportunity Seeking Behavior and Financial Risk Taking, and
the removal of spending and value seeking measures.
2.4.2.1 Opportunity seeking behavior. Five statements were placed within the survey
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regarding participants’ behavior within the last five years. Participants self-reported their
frequency of participation using a seven-point Likert scale with response items as follows: 1=
never, 2= less than once a month, 3= once a month, 4= 2-3 times per month, 5= once a week, 6=
2-3 times per week, 7= daily. Responses were subjected to a principal components exploratory
factor analysis, using Promax rotation with no restrictions on numbers of factors. Loadings less
than .4 were suppressed. All items loaded on one factor to account for 88.59% total variability.
An overall score was calculated using factor loadings from a factor analysis to weight scores.
Each question response was multiplied by the respective factor loading. All scores were averaged
for a final Opportunity Seeking score. The Opportunity Seeking statements, with their factor
loadings, were: Have you participated in the following within the last five years? Stock Day
Trading (.947), Real Estate Flipping (.908), Multi-Level Marketing Businesses (.939), Agreed to
co-sign a loan for a stranger in exchange for money (.961), Investment opportunities on Craig’s
List or any other online listings (.965), Door to door magazine sales (.957), Business
opportunities that require an upfront fee (.955), and A side business within your home (Bitcoin,
Amway, Address labeling, etc.; .896). Internal consistency was measures using Chronbach’s
Alpha and found to be (a = .83).
2.4.2.2 Financial risk taking. Two statements created for this study were placed within
the survey regarding financial risk-taking behavior. These statements were, “How often do you
currently engage in financial risk taking (gambling, risky investments, etc.)?” and “How often
have you engaged financial risk taking like gambling or risky investments in your adult past?”
Participants self-reported their frequency of participation using a seven-point Likert scale with
response items as follows: 1= never, 2= less than once a month, 3= once a month, 4= 2-3 times
per month, 5= once a week, 6= 2-3 times per week, 7= daily. Item responses were added for each
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participant. These two questions were created for this specific survey and were not replicated in
any subsequent survey. Internal consistency testing was conducted on subsets of this study and
received Chronbach’s Alpha of (a =.82).

2.5

Results
2.5.1

Measure Assessments

2.5.1.1 Impulsivity. As in part A of Study 1, an exploratory factor analysis was used to
identify factor loadings and structure for the eight items in the BIS used in these studies. Promax
rotation was used, as items were assumed from previous theory and knowledge of the scale to be
correlated. No limitation of number of factors were set. Coefficients loading less than .4 were
suppressed Replicating the results in the part A exploratory factor analysis on impulsivity, two
factors were identified and matched the previously titled Impulse Action (39.71%) and Impulse
Plan (24.63%), and cumulatively accounted for 64.34% total variance. As in the previous
analysis, the same four items loaded for each factor as follows: I plan tasks carefully (.722, IP); I
do things without thinking (.858, IA); I don’t “pay attention” (.761, IA); I am self-controlled
(.756, IP); I concentrate easily (.791, IP); I am a careful thinker (.838, IP); I say things without
thinking (.839, IA); I act on the spur of the moment (.821, IA).
2.5.1.2 Descriptive and bivariate analyses. First, descriptive statistics were calculated for
all of the variables. A correlational analysis (Appendix F) was generated between age with all
sub measures of the EFI (MD, SP, IC, EM, ORG), credit card misuse, opportunity seeking
behavior, and financial risk taking. Age was moderately correlated with subscales of the
Executive Function Index (impulse control, r = -.463; organization, r = -.446), credit card misuse
(r = .464) and opportunity seeking behavior (r = .388). In the subsequent analyses, age was
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controlled for as a covariate. Gender groups were compared for all dependent variables and
found to have no significant differences, using independent T-tests (p >.10); thus, it was not
necessary to control for gender within subsequent analyses.
After confirmation of normality of distribution of the variables, zero-order correlational
analysis (Appendix F) was used to identify relations between the variables of executive function
index (EFI), the five-factor personality inventory (TIPI), impulsiveness (BIS-8), credit card
misuse, opportunity seeking, and financial risk taking. Moderate to strong correlations were
identified between EFI impulse control and Impulse Action (r = .-584) and EFI organization (r =
.689); Impulse Plan with conscientiousness (r = .584) and EFI strategic planning (r = -.687), EFI
organization with Impulse Action (r = .584), and EFI motivational drive with openness (r =
.555).
For subsequent analyses, the composite consumer behavior measure was identified as
high, average, and low, using approximately top 10% as high and approximately bottom 10% as
low. The remaining 80% of participants were excluded from the extreme-groups analyses. A
score for global impulsive consumer behavior was also created by averaging measures of
opportunity seeking, financial risk taking, and credit card misuse. High Impulsive Consumers
(N=483) ranged in scores from 1 to 1.43, and Low Impulsive Consumers (N=521) ranged in
scores from 5.21 to 7.
As in Study 1A, a series of one-way ANCOVAs was performed to identify differences in
means of EFI subscales between high and low impulsive consumer behavior. There were
significant differences between high and low purchase groups in EFI impulse control F(1, 1003)
= 2,910.79, p < .001, ƞ2 = .744, and EFI organization F(1,1003) = 2,343.31, p < .001, ƞ2=.70, but
not in any other EFI subscales (see Table 2.4).
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Table 2.4 EFI and High vs. Low Impulsive Consumer Behavior Groups
(*p < .001)
Motivational drive

Impulsive Consumer
Behavior
Low
High

Mean

Std. Error

3.458
3.675

.028
.027

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
3.403
3.513
3.622
3.728

Organization*

Low
High

4.019
1.904

.031
.030

3.957
1.845

4.080
1.963

Strategic Planning

Low
High

3.587
3.838

.022
.021

3.544
3.798

3.629
3.879

Impulse Control*

Low
High

4.066
1.902

.029
.028

4.009
1.848

4.123
1.957

Empathy

Low
High

3.989
3.760

.027
.026

3.937
3.710

4.041
3.811

A series of one-way ANCOVAs were also performed to compare means of all five
measures of personality (openness, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and
extroversion) between high and low groups of impulsive consumer behavior. There were
significant differences between high and low impulsive consumer behavior groups for
conscientiousness F(1,1003) = 1,319.35, p < .001, ƞ2 = .568, but not the other measures of
personality. The possible range of scores for all of the personality measures ranged from 2 to 14
(see Table 2.5).
Table 2.5 Personality and High vs. Low Impulsive Consumer Behavior Groups
(*p < .001)

Impulsive Consumer
Behavior
Low
High

Mean
6.894
8.299

.114
.110

Agreeableness

Low
High

10.946
8.250

.084
.081

10.781
8.090

11.111
8.409

Neuroticism

Low
High

5.507
7.653

.098
.095

5.314
7.467

5.700
7.838

Openness

Low
High

9.427
8.378

.097
.093

9.237
8.195

9.616
8.561

Conscientiousness *

Low
High

12.400
8.405

.079
.076

12.244
8.255

12.555
8.555

Extroversion

Std. Error

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
6.671
7.118
8.084
8.515
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A series of one-way ANCOVAs was used to compare high and low impulsive consumer
group within two types of impulsivity from the BIS-8: Impulse Action and Impulse Plan. Results
indicated significant differences between high and low impulsive consumer groups in Impulse
Action, F(1, 1003) = 11,834.11, p < .001, ƞ2 = .647. No significant differences between high and
low impulsive consumer groups were identified for Impulse Plan (see Table 2.6).

Table 2.6 Impulsivity and High vs. Low Impulsive Consumer Behavior Groups

(*p < .001)
Impulse action*

Impulsive Consumer
Behavior
Low
High

Impulse plan

2.6

Low
High

Mean

Std. Error

1.872
3.932

.035
.033

1.953
1.719

.028
.027

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
1.804
1.940
3.867
3.998
1.899
1.667

2.008
1.771

Study 1 Discussion
According to Spinella (2005a), he created the Executive Function Index in an attempt to

generate an efficient and valid self-report measure of executive function for normal populations.
Spinella’s intent for this measure was for use in large-sample surveys and studies. Through
factor analysis, Spinella derived the five sub-factors of impulse control, organization, strategic
planning, motivational drive, and empathy. Previous literature cited in this paper would suggest
that impulsive consumer behavior should be strongly related to the five subscales of the
Executive Function Index that are thought to measure working memory capacity, inhibitory
control, and to a lesser extent, cognitive flexibility. In both parts (A and B) of Study 1, impulsive
consumer behavior (as measured with various consumer behaviors of opportunity seeking,
financial risk taking, spending, value seeking, and credit card misuse combined to make
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composite scores) was consistently associated with significant differences in the subscale
measures of Impulse Control and Organization within the Executive Function Index, but not in
the subscales of Motivational Drive, Strategic Planning, and Empathy. These findings suggest
that EFI Impulse Control and Organization may measure some components of executive function
as it pertains to or is related to consumer behavior, whereas EFI Motivational Drive, Strategic
Planning and Empathy do not.
The results from this study also demonstrated that the measure for impulsivity (BIS-8)
reflected two factors for overall impulsivity, called Impulse Action (to reflect motor impulsivity)
and Impulse Plan (to reflect non-planning and attention control). This outcome from the
exploratory factor analysis is different from the previous factors of non-planning, motor, and
attentional impulsiveness earlier identified within the larger Barratt Impulsiveness Measure
(Witney, Jameson, & Hinson, 2004). For both datasets in Study 1, groups of high and low
impulsive consumer behavior demonstrated differences within Impulse Action but not Impulse
Plan. More specifically, the results from this study suggest that the impulsivity related to
spending behavior, high risk financial investments, financial opportunity seeking, and valueseeking behaviors reflects impulsive physical activity, motor, or movement like “doing things
without thinking.” The other type of Impulsivity called Impulse Plan, which is associated with
the absence of planning, careful thinking, and concentration, was not related to consumer
behavior.
In addition, the following variables demonstrated moderate-to-strong correlations in both
datasets (Parts A and B): EFI Impulse Control and EFI Organization with Impulse Action, EFI
Strategic Planning with Conscientiousness and Impulse Plan, and EFI Motivational Drive with
Extroversion. These correlations suggest EFI subscales of Impulse Control and Organization are
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more closely associated with the type of impulsive behavior (motor impulsivity) related to
impulsive consumer behavior, and potentially the components of executive function that can
account for motor impulsivity and impulsive consumer behavior. However, these correlations
also suggest some subscales of the EFI, specifically Strategic Planning and Motivational Drive,
are more closely associated with personality traits (conscientiousness and extroversion) than with
executive functions. Furthermore, subscales of Strategic Planning and Motivational Drive appear
not to be strongly related with the form of impulsivity related to consumer behavior. For
personality, only conscientiousness was found to be related to impulsive consumer behavior in
both datasets, as higher conscientiousness was associated with lower impulsive consumer
behavior. Conscientiousness was also correlated with Impulse Plan, or impulsivity that results
from a lack of planning, but not with motor impulsivity (Impulse Action), or with the subscales
of the EFI (organization and impulse control) that seem to measure components of executive
function utilized (or not utilized) in impulsive consumer behavior. These findings suggest that
impulsive consumer behavior may be informed by not just executive functions but perhaps some
personality trait(s) as well, specifically within a type of impulsivity different from the type
related and associated with executive functions.
A possible objection to extreme group comparison methodology may be made and can be
addressed. The aim of the extreme-group was to see how the most versus least impulsive
consumers compared on EFI, personality, and BIS measures. Given the size of the current
sample, it was possible to maintain statistical power even with extreme groups consisting of only
the top and bottom 10% of the consumer-behavior distribution. However, this does assume that
these most-extreme spenders differ from the middle 80% quantitatively and linearly, and not
qualitatively. In support of this assumption, Appendices U and V show the means that would
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have been obtained had the more traditional quartile splits been used for this analysis. Scores for
the measures of interest generally varied systematically between the low- and high-impulsive
consumer behavior groups.
As certain EFI subscales demonstrated a relationship with impulsive consumer behavior,
the results from this study provide some evidence that measures of EFI organization and impulse
control should correlate with working memory capacity and perhaps inhibitory control,
respectively; and other subscales of the EFI most likely reflect cognitive flexibility and/or
personality traits. In addition, the EFI subscales of organization and impulse control are also
measures that relate to impulsive consumer behavior.
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3.1

STUDY 2

Methods
3.1.1

Participants

Participants (N = 253) were recruited through Mechanical Turk for Amazon. At any point
during their participation, volunteers were able to skip a question or choose not to finish without
penalty. Consent was gained prior to participation. Participants in this study ranged in age from
18 to 89, with a mean age of 38.5 years. Of the participants, 60% were male, 39% were female,
and .4% transgender, and the remaining preferred not to answer. Participants identified their
primary race/ethnicity as follows: 50.3% of participants identified their ethnicity as Caucasian or
White, 21.7% identified as African-American or Black, 3.6% as Hispanic, 2.0% as Asian, .8% as
other, and 21.4% preferred not to answer. Average overall response time to the study was 37
minutes. Participants whose overall response time was less than seven minutes were removed
from the study (n=11) to ensure thoughtful and deliberate responses from individuals.
Participants were given a one-hour time limit to complete the study. Approval to conduct this
research study was obtained by Georgia State University Institutional Review Board prior to
collecting any data.
3.1.2

Apparatus and Measures

A web link generated by Psytoolkit was posted in Mechanical Turk and in Sona Systems
for Georgia State University for recruitment. Psytoolkit is an open access, privately owned
website that offers psychological experiments and surveys, all previously validated, for use in
research. As part of the testing sequence, participants also completed other tasks (e.g., Iowa
Gambling Task) that are not part of the current study. All measures and questions were
administered via participants’ personal computers. After obtaining demographic information,
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including age, gender, and racial/ethnic identification, the following behavioral tests and selfreport measures were administered:
3.1.2.1 Purchasing behavior. A series of questions were interspersed within the
experiment to simulate a purchasing experience of a personal mobile device. For the first
question, participants were asked to quantify a budget for this purchase. Thirteen subsequent
questions offered additional upgrades for the mobile device as well as a second tablet, all for
additional cost. All of these questions are listed in Appendix U. The measure for this task was
calculated with a numerical value for responses of “yes” and “no.” An additional measure was
calculated between the difference of budget established at the beginning of the survey and the
total money spent at the end of the study.
3.1.2.2 Corsi. The Corsi Block Test, similar to digit-span tasks, is a task that presented
nine blocks or shapes sequentially. Participants were instructed to remember the order of
sequential presentation and replicate at their own pace. The number of trials for this task was
based on the success of the previous trial. At a minimum, participants completed two trials with
two-block spans, which were presented first. A total of 20 Corsi trials would be administered if
an individual successfully achieved each iteration up to a nine-block span. Participants had to
respond correctly on two consecutive trials of each span to confirm success of that span length,
and to move to a larger span. The presentation of stimuli was set at 500 milliseconds per block
with a countdown before the first block display. The dependent measure for this task was the
highest span length a participant achieved. This span measure was considered an estimate of
working memory capacity. Most healthy adults will score between a 5- and 7-item span on the
manual version of this task (Corsi, 1972). This task was administered twice within the study, and
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the average participants’ Corsi span from both administrations was calculated and used in
subsequent analyses.
3.1.2.3 Task/attention-switching. Attention shifting tasks may reflect set-switching or
cognitive flexibility and are considered one measure of executive function. The GRID task used
in this study (a version of the Letter-Number task described by Rogers and Monsell, 1995)
involves a numeral-letter pair displayed in 2000 milliseconds in one of four cells of a 2x2 grid on
the screen. If the characters appear in one of the top two cells, participants must indicate whether
the numeral is odd or even. If the characters appear in either of the bottom cells, participants
must respond by pressing letter “B” or “N,” depending on whether the letter is consonant or
vowel. Repeated trials with either rule are used to establish a baseline speed for making the
odd/even or consonant/vowel judgment. Set-switching trials occur whenever the rule for trial N
is different than the rule for trial N-1. The difference between these response times (switch time)
provides a measure of cognitive flexibility, such that shorter switch times indicated higher
cognitive flexibility. For this study, a set of 20 practice trials for letters only on the top two cells
and then another set of 20 trials for numbers only on the bottom two cells were given prior to
100 complete trials of both letters and numbers, with the cell selected randomly for each trial
from the entire grid. This task provides measurements of two types of performance cost: mix cost
and switch cost. Mix cost is the performance cost to mix two different tasks, and switch cost is
the performance cost to switch between two sequentially presented tasks.
3.1.2.4 N-Back. The N-Back task is a behavioral measure that was introduced by Wayne
Kirchner (1958). This measure is used primarily as a measure of working memory capacity. The
task requires a participant, while being presented with a sequence of stimuli, to identify
whenever a current stimulus matches a stimulus N positions back in the sequence. Thus,
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participants are required in this task continuously to update their working memories to keep track
of the most recent N items to compare to the current stimulus. To do so, participants must both
hold and manipulate information to be successful. For this study, the N was set to 3-back in the
sequence. Two sets of 50 trials of N-back were given, each at a 500-millisecond display of each
letter in the sequence.
3.1.2.5 Stroop. The Stroop task has been a standard for measuring inhibitory control
since developed by Stroop (1935). The color-word task requires individuals to identify the font
colors of color words and is a measure of executive attention and inhibitory control. Within this
task, there are trials in which the color used to display the word is either same (congruent) or
different (incongruent) to the meaning of the color word. The difference in response times
between incongruent and baseline trials (or sometimes, as was done here, between incongruent
and congruent trials) is identified as the Stroop effect, and reflects the cost of interference from
the irrelevant cue (word meaning) on the attended cue (word color; Stroop, 1935). For this study,
participants completed 40 trials. Colors/words used were yellow, blue, red, and green. Stimuli
were presented and participants were required to respond by pressing the y, r, b, or g key based
on color of the word within 2000 ms. After a response, a new trial was presented within 500
seconds. The Stroop task in Psytoolkit was written to include 27% congruent trials and 63%
incongruent trials, in random order.
3.1.2.6 Go/No-Go. Go/No-Go tasks can be a measure of impulsivity, as participants are
required to inhibit a habitual response. In this particular version, participants were given a cue of
Go and required to respond by clicking the space bar. A cue of No-Go was also given in which
participants were not to respond. Difficulty was increased by presenting more Go cues than No-
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Go cues. Errors and response times are used for the measure of behavioral inhibition. This task
presented 20 Go trials and five No-Go trials.
3.1.2.7 Stop Signal. The Stop Signal task (Lappin & Erickson, 1966) is a variation of
Go/No-Go and is used to measure inhibitory control. For this particular version, participants
were required to respond with either letters b or n, depending on whether the cue (arrow) was
pointing left or right, respectively. Responses were required within 500 milliseconds of stimulus
presentation, and feedback was given after 250 milliseconds. The response-offset asynchrony
was 2000 milliseconds after a wrong response, with no delay after a correct response. After a
training phase, a red circle (stop signal) appeared on some trials, in which participants are not to
respond to the direction of the arrow. False-alarms (errors) in response were considered measures
of inability to inhibit response. A total of 50 go trials and 20 stop-signal trials, in random order,
were given in this task.
3.1.2.8 Wisconsin Card Sort. The Wisconsin Card Sort Task used for this study is
grounded in Grant & Berg’s (1948) version used to measure cognitive flexibility. For this study,
participants were presented with four cards that could be classified in three different ways: color
of symbols on the card (yellow, blue, green, or red), shape of the symbols (circle, start, cross,
triangle), or number of symbols (one, two, three, four) on each card. The classification rule
changed every ten cards. Thus, the task required participants to figure out the sorting rule via
trial-and-error, and then to switch to a new rule when necessary. The task measures how well an
individual adapts to changing rules, with perseverations (repeated attempts with an old rule) as a
measure of cognitive (in)flexibility. For this particular version, participants were given up to ten
seconds to respond to each card before a new trial was presented. A total of 74 trials were given
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in this task. Visual and auditory feedback (either “correct” or “wrong”) was provided for 500ms
after each trial so that participants could learn the classification rule.
3.1.2.9 Other measures. The measures for Impulsiveness, Credit Card Misuse, Five
Factor Personality Inventory, and Executive Function Index were the same self-report measures
utilized in the Study 1, parts A and B. These items are exhibited in Appendices A, B, C, D, and
E. Questions for the purchasing task are exhibited in Appendix U.
3.1.2.10 Procedure. All surveys were completed online, and participants were
compensated five dollars when recruited through Mechanical Turk. The entire study was
administered through a link to the host website (psytoolkit.org). The subsequent order of
questions and experiments are listed in Appendix I.
3.2

Results
First, demographics were measured to determine whether there were any significant

effects of age, gender, and ethnicity/race on all other variables, including the dependent variables
of purchasing, and credit card misuse (See Appendix L & M). Some of the correlations with age
were significant (age correlations range: -.023 to .27), so age was controlled as a covariate in all
subsequent ANOVAs. No significant differences between gender or race/ethnicity groups were
observed in a series of independent samples t-tests (p >. 16); consequently, subsequent ANOVAs
did not include these grouping variables.
Means and standard deviations were calculated for the variables of Executive Function
Index (EFI), the Five Factor Personality Inventory, the BIS-8, and all behavioral computerized
tasks (N-back, Corsi, Stop Signal, Task Switching, Stroop, Wisconsin Card Sorting, and Go/NoGo; see Appendix K for descriptive statistics).
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3.2.1

Correlations Between EFI, Executive Function, and Personality

Next, zero-order correlations were calculated to investigate the associations between the
indicators of working memory (N-Back and Corsi), cognitive flexibility (Task Switching and
Wisconsin Card Sorting), and behavioral inhibition (Stroop, Go/No-Go, and Stop Signal), Big
Five Personality Traits, and Indicators of Impulse Plan and Impulse Action from the BIS-8.
There were significant correlations, as expected, between measures of each component; however,
all of the correlations would be considered weak. For working memory, N-back false positives
were negatively correlated with Corsi mean, r(253) = -.235, p < .001, and positively correlated
with N-back misses, r(253) = .218, p < .001. Within measures of inhibitory control, Go/No-Go
response times were correlated with Go/No-Go error rate, r(253) = -.174, p = .005, and Stop
Signal error rate, r(253) = -.159, p = .011, but were not significantly correlated with Stroop
accuracy or response-time interference measures. There were no significant correlations between
measures from the GRID and Wisconsin Card Sorting task.
In order to identify how much variability in the Executive Function Index was associated
with the behavioral measures of executive function used in Study 2, bivariate correlations were
also calculated between EFI subscales of motivational drive (EFI MD), strategic planning (EFI
SP), organization (EFI ORG), and impulse control (EFI IC), and each measure from the
behavioral tasks. The full correlational analyses are displayed in Appendices H, I, and J. Some of
the significant correlations that are relevant to the primary hypotheses are highlighted here.
Significant correlations were observed between N-back misses and EFI IC r(253) = -.20, p =
.002, and EFI ORG r(253) = -.16, p = .011, between GO/NO-GO response times and EFI ORG
r(253) = -.14, p < .023, and between Stop Signal error rate and EFI IC r(253) = -.16, p = .01, and
EFI ORG r(253) = -.220, p <.001. Wisconsin Card Sort perseveration error rate correlated
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significantly with EFI IC, r(253) = -.17, p = .007, and ORG r(253) = -.12, p = .049. Taskswitching MixCost and EFI IC correlated significantly as well, r(253) = .17, p =.007. It is
interesting to note that no significant correlations were found between the two EFI subscales of
Motivational Drive (MD) and Strategic Planning (SP) and the behavioral tasks selected to
measure the executive functions of cognitive flexibility, working memory, and inhibitory control.
These findings from the correlational analyses are displayed in Appendix P.
To test what relations might exist between the Executive Function Index and the Five
Factor Personality Inventory, zero-order correlations were examined. Although most
relationships were found to be significant, almost all demonstrated weak correlational effects of r
< .40. EFI Organization was found to correlate with all five personality dimensions: extraversion
r(253) = .18, p < .004, agreeableness r(253) = .36 p < .001, conscientiousness r(253) = .34, p <
.001, openness r(253) = .29, p <.001, and neuroticism r(253) = .36, p < .001. EFI Impulse
Control was positively correlated with agreeableness r(253) = .33, p < .001, conscientiousness
r(253) = .22, p < .001, and neuroticism r(253) = .18, p < .001. Strategic Planning correlated with
extroversion r(253) = .23, p <.001, agreeableness r(253) = .28, p <.001, conscientiousness r(253)
= .53, p <.001, neuroticism r(253) = .29, p < .001, and openness r(253) =.20, p < .01.
Motivational Drive correlated with extraversion r(253) = .63, p <.001, agreeableness r(253) =
.34, p <.001, conscientiousness r(253) = .36, p < .001, neuroticism r(253) = .44, p < .001, and
openness r(253) = .55, p < .001. It is important to note that the variables that showed moderateto-strong correlations with personality measures were also the two EFI subscales (strategic
planning and motivational drive) that did not correlate with the behavioral measures of executive
function used in Study 2. A partial correlation was run between all five measures of personality
and the three composite scores of executive function: working memory (Nback and Corsi),
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inhibitory control (Stopsignal, Go/Nogo, and Stroop), and cognitive flexibility (WCT and
Taskswitching). Inhibitory control was correlated with conscientiousness r(235) = -.160, p =
.011, and working memory was correlated significantly with extraversion, r(253) = .171, p =
.007.
Finally, a partial correlation was performed between the EFI subscales, the composite
scores of cognitive flexibility, inhibitory control, and working memory, while controlling for the
five scales of personality. All correlations between EFI subscales and EF composite measures
were not significant when controlling for personality, except for the relationship between EFI
Organization and inhibitory control. This correlation was significant, r(253) = -.150, p = .019.
3.2.2

Extreme-Groups Analyses.

For the subsequent analyses, quartile splits were used to separate participants into groups.
Composite scores for working memory capacity were created by calculating the averaged zscores of the working memory (WM) measures (Corsi max, reverse scored, and N-back misses).
One-fourth of the original participants were considered to have high WM (n = 61, z range -1.21
to -0.35), and one-fourth were considered to have low WM (n = 64, z range 0.27 to 1.42). The
remaining participants (n = 128) were not included in the extreme-groups analyses. In addition,
high/low categories were similarly created using quartile splits for the composite of inhibition.
Scores were tabulated by averaging z-scores of Stroop interference, Stroop error, Go/No-Go
error, and Stop signal error. Approximately one-fourth of participants were considered to have
low inhibitory control (n=79, z range 24 to 1.47), meaning they had more error and interference
rates, and one-fourth of participants were considered to have high inhibitory control (n=86, z
range -.29 to -.89) in that their scores showed less interference and lower error rates. High and
low categories for cognitive flexibility were also calculated by averaging the z-scores of
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Wisconsin Card Sort perseveration error and Task switching switch cost. Approximately onefourth of participants were considered to have low cognitive flexibility (n= 64, z range -1.58 to .51), and approximately one-fourth of participants were considered to have high cognitive
flexibility (n= .36 to 4.5).
Various derived measures were calculated within the purchasing task for Study 2. For
impulsive purchasing behavior, a measure was created by adding the number of yes or no
responses to the purchasing task questions. The responses were tallied with numerical value of 2
for yes, and 1 for no. The scores were then coded into groups of high/average/low purchase. The
bottom quartile of participants was considered to be low spenders (n = 72, range 12-21), and the
top quartile was considered to include high spenders (n = 63, range 24-28). This measure was
named “Times Purchased.” Second, a simple addition of all money amounts a participant
indicated they were willing to spend was calculated and called “Purchase Total.” Third, the total
amount a participant purchased minus the amount participants reported as purchased at the end
of the task was calculated and named “Purchase Total Known.” This is how accurately
participants remembered the amount of money they had been willing to spend. Fourth, the total
amount purchased minus the original budget was calculated and called “Purchase Difference 1.”
A fifth calculation was made by subtracting the participants reported budget at the end of the
survey from the actual amount spent to that point. This calculation was “Purchase Difference 2.”
The final calculation was made by subtracting the reported budget at the end of the survey (Q16)
from the initial amount budgeted at the beginning of the survey (Q1) and was titled “Budget
Difference.” This is a measure of how well participants remembered their original budget. For
each of these purchasing-behavior measures, extreme groups were formed using quartile splits.
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For all subsequent analyses, an alpha level of .001 was established for significance in
order to address multiple comparisons and analyses.
3.2.3

EFI Effects on Executive Function

A series of one-way ANOVAs were performed to identify differences between high and
low extreme groups of each of the Executive Function Index on the three composite scores
developed for cognitive flexibility, working memory, and inhibitory control. Of these analyses,
there were significant differences between high and low groups of EFI Organization on
inhibitory control, F(1,136) = 9.50, p =.001, ƞ2 = .056; although the effect of EFI Impulse
Control on working memory approached this threshold, F(1,135) = 7.174, p = .002, ƞ2 = .053.
These results indicate individuals who scored high in Organization on the EFI were significantly
higher in inhibitory control in behavioral tasks. Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 demonstrate these
findings. No significant differences were found in extreme-groups analyses of the other EFI
subscales.

Table 3.1 EFI Organization Extreme Groups on Executive Function
95% Confidence Interval
Dependent Variable EFI Organization Score

Mean

Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound

Cognitive
Flexibility

High

.133

.090

-.045

.312

Low

-.073

.084

-.239

.092

Working
Memory

High
Low

.155
-.043

.078
.072

.002
-.186

.309
.100

Inhibitory Control* High

.120

.053

.016

.225

Low

-.102

.049

-.199

-.005
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Table 3.2 EFI Impulse Control Extreme Groups on Executive Function
EFI Impulse Control
Score
Cognitive flexibility Low
High

Mean

Std. Error

.077
.108

.099
.094

Working
Memory*

Low
High

-.082
.201

.073
.077

-.225
.050

.062
.352

Inhibitory
Control

Low
High

-.027
.114

.052
.055

-.130
.005

.077
.230

3.2.4

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
-.118
.272
-.078
.293

Purchasing Behavior Effects on Executive Function

A series of one-way ANCOVAs, with a covariate of age, were used to identify
differences between extreme groups of purchase total on composite executive function
components of working memory, inhibitory control, and cognitive flexibility. Within the
univariate analyses, a significant difference was identified between high and low groups of
purchase total for the working memory composite, F(1,137) = 18.62, p < .001, ƞ2 = .12. The high
and low purchase total groups did not differ significantly in inhibitory control or cognitive
flexibility (see descriptive statistics in Table 3.3).
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Table 3.3 Purchase Total Extreme Groups on Executive Function
95% Confidence Interval
Total Purchase

Mean

Working
Memory*

Low
High

.230
-.190

.065
.072

.100
-.332

.359
-.048

Inhibitory
Control

Low
High

.026
.116

.059
.054

-.090
.011

.142
.222

Cognitive Flexibility Low

-.116

.086

-.286

.054

High

.066

.078

-.088

.221

3.2.5

Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound

Executive Function Effects on Purchasing Behavior

Similarly, a series of one-way ANCOVAs were used to identify differences between
extreme groups of working memory on all of the measures for purchasing. Within the univariate
analyses, five significant differences between high and low working memory groups were
identified. First, a significant difference was found between working-memory groups on
purchase total, (how much the participants actually spent), F(1,124) = 26.91, p < .001, ƞ2 = .216.
Second, a significant difference was observed between groups on purchase total known (how
accurately participants recalled the amount they spent), F(1,124) = 21.82, p < .001, ƞ2 = 117.
Third, a significant difference was identified between the high and low WMC groups on
purchase difference 1 (the difference between the amount participants actually purchased and
how much they reported their budget to be at the beginning of the survey), F(124) = 28.31, p
<.001, ƞ2 = 211. Fourth, there was a significant difference between WMC groups for purchase
difference 2 (the difference between the amount participants spent and what they remembered
and reported their original budget to be at the end of the survey), F(1,124) = 20.15, p < .001, ƞ2 =
.184. A final significant difference was between WM groups in times purchased (the total
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number of times they chose to purchase), F(1,124) = 18.04, p < .001, ƞ2 = .145. Descriptive
statistics for these comparisons are shown in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4 Working Memory Extreme Groups on Executive Function
95% Confidence Interval
Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
52.261
307.576
514.455
53.097
692.405
902.595

Dependent Variable
Purchase Total*

Working
Memory
High
Low

Mean
411.016
797.500

Purchase Total
Known*

High
Low

-25.531
345.742

55.754
56.646

-135.884
233.623

84.822
457.861

Purchase Difference* High
Low

101.250
486.565

50.802
51.615

.699
384.405

201.801
588.724

Purchase Difference* High
Two
Low

-29.547
397.565

65.432
66.479

-159.056
265.983

99.962
529.146

Budget Difference

High
Low

-130.797
-89.000

42.486
43.166

-214.888
-174.437

-46.705
-3.563

Times Purchased*

High
Low

20.952
23.453

.413
.420

22.635
20.121

24.271
21.782

A series of one-way ANCOVAs were conducted to identify meaningful differences
between high and low groups of inhibitory control or high and low groups of cognitive flexibility
within all of the purchasing measures. No significant differences were identified (p >.10 for all).
3.2.6

EFI Effects on Purchasing Behavior

Quartile splits were used to form high and low groups on each of the EFI subscales, and
then a series of one-way ANCOVAs were performed to identify differences between high and
low EFI subscales of impulse control, organization, strategic planning, empathy, and
motivational drive groups on purchasing behavior measures. For these quartile splits, high
indicates better or more impulse control, organization, strategic planning, empathy, and
motivational drive. Only the EFI Organization subscale demonstrated significant differences in
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purchasing behavior. High and low groups of EFI Organization were significantly different for
the purchasing measures of purchase total, F(1,140) = 10.79, p = .001, ƞ2 = .072, and on times
purchased, F(1,140) = 11.12, p =.001, ƞ2 = .075. Participants in the low EFI Organization group
spent significantly more and made significantly more purchases than high EFI Organization
participants, as is shown in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5 EFI Organization Extreme Groups comparisons on Purchasing Behavior
95% Confidence Interval
Dependent Variable

Organization

Mean

Std. Error

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Purchase Total*

Low
High

672.109
439.605

52.160
47.865

568.973
344.961

775.246
534.250

Purchase Total Known

Low
High

194.391
10.789

54.316
49.844

86.991
-87.767

301.790
109.346

Purchase Difference

Low
High

344.641
121.184

52.394
48.080

241.041
26.115

448.240
216.254

Purchase Difference
Two

Low
High

239.281
-21.592

63.657
58.416

113.411
-137.098

365.151
93.914

Budget Difference

Low
High

-105.359
-142.776

42.017
38.557

-188.440
-219.016

-22.279
-66.536

Times Purchased*

Low

23.316

.384

20.819

22.337

High

21.578

.352

22.619

24.012

3.2.7

Executive Function Effects on Impulsivity.

However, in a series of ANCOVAs, participants in the high and low groups of inhibitory
control demonstrated significant differences for impulse action, F(1,128) = 13.228, p <.001, ƞ2 =
.178, but not impulse plan, F(1,128) = .185, p = .852, ƞ2 = .003. High and low groups of
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cognitive flexibility and working memory demonstrated no significant differences in either
impulse action or impulse plan, although the working memory comparison for impulse action (p
= .002) approached the conservative threshold set for these multiple comparisons, as shown in
Error! Reference source not found.. Participants high in inhibitory control scored significantly
more in impulse action, as shown in

Table 3..
Table 3.6 Inhibitory Control Extreme Group Comparison on Impulsivity

95% Confidence Interval
Inhibition

Mean

Std. Error Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Impulse Plan

High
Low

5.600
6.286

.504
.512

4.602
5.272

6.598
7.300

Impulse Action

High

7.877

.609

6.673

9.081

Low

11.032

.618

9.808

12.255

Table 3.7 Working Memory Extreme Group Comparison on Impulsivity

95% Confidence Interval
Impulse Plan
Impulse Action

Working Memory

Mean

Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound

High
Low
High

6.000
5.758
8.094

.558
.567
.628

4.895
4.635
6.851

7.105
6.881
9.336

Low

10.984

.638

9.722

12.246

Table 3.8 Cognitive Flexibility Extreme Group Comparison on Impulsivity

95% Confidence Interval
Impulse Plan
Impulse Action

Cognitive Flexibility

Mean

Std. Error

Lower Bound Upper Bound

Low
High
Low

6.292
5.627
9.903

.513
.567
.646

5.276
4.505
8.626

7.308
6.749
11.180

High

8.831

.713

7.420

10.241
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3.3

Discussion
Spinella (2007) claimed that EFI measures executive function. The correlational results

from Study 2 offer some evidence regarding the accuracy of that claim. On the one hand, the
results revealed that measures of EFI Organization and Impulse Control subscales were
correlated with performance-based measures of working memory and inhibitory control. On the
other hand, these correlations were very weak, and the other subscales of the EFI were unrelated
to executive function task performance. At most, it may be inferred that only EFI Organization
and Impulse Control measure some aspects of the executive function components described by
Miyake and Friedman (2012).
It is noteworthy, however, that subscales of the EFI demonstrated stronger correlations
with the Five Factor Personality measures than the behavioral measures of working memory
capacity, inhibitory control, and cognitive flexibility. To test whether or not the differences in
these correlations were significant, z-tests were performed on the highest scoring correlation for
the EFI subscales and compared between the behavioral measures and personality scales. These
comparisons found there was no significant difference between the correlations between Impulse
Control and Nback misses and Agreeableness, p = .1236. For Organization, there was a
significant difference between correlations with Stop Signal and Agreeableness, with Stop Signal
being the higher correlation, p = .0418. For both Strategic Planning and Motivational Drive, the
correlations with all behavioral measures were not significant. The comparisons between r scores
of the strongest correlation with a behavioral measure of executive function and
conscientiousness (p = .0274) and extroversion (p = .0183), respectively, demonstrated
significant differences. Thus, it can be argued that the Executive Function Index is more strongly
correlated with personality measures rather than executive function.
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These findings suggest that the EFI, while somewhat measuring executive functions
through the two subscales of Impulse Control and Organization, may be more successful at
measuring either personality traits or a common variable that informs both executive function
and personality with the two subscales of Motivational Drive and Strategic Planning.
These results may be at least partially accounted for by method variance, or monomethod bias, given both the EFI and Big Five measures are self-report surveys. That is, variables
that affect self-report instruments—whether those variables reflect temperament (e.g., openness
and conscientiousness may influence how one responds to self-report items, irrespective of scale)
or cognition (e.g., memory failures or biases might influence what gets reported, irrespective of
the topic of the scale)—might be common across instruments, and thus inflate the intercorrelation of self-reports. Researchers have attempted to minimize these effects by using
various methods, for instance by using partial correlation methodology. Thus, this paper is
limited in acknowledging and addressing how much of the correlations between the EFI and the
Big Five can be accounted for in common method variance, as well as whether or not the
correlations between the behavior tasks in EF used in this study with the EFI (Lindell & Witney,
2001; Spector, 2006).
A third possibility is that personality traits moderate or mediate relationships with
components of executive function. In particular, self-insight and response to self-report may (and
most likely would be) influenced by current knowledge of one’s personality. The literature on
the relation between personality and EF is growing in size but not in clarity. Significant
relationships between personality dimensions and particular executive functions have been
reported, but typically not replicated (e.g., Buchanan, 2015; Soubelet & Salthouse, 2010;
Unsworth et al., 2009; Williams, Suchy, & Rau, 2009). For example, Williams et al. (2009)
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summarized evidence and arguments that conscientiousness and EF reflect common
neurocognitive systems, and Buchanan (2015) reported some evidence to support such a
relationship; however, Soubelet and Salthouse (2011) and Unsworth et al. (2009) found no
relationships between EF tasks and conscientiousness (as the present findings corroborated) but
rather reported a relationship between EF and openness. The only thing that seems clear at this
point is that the personality-EF relationship remains unclear.
Nevertheless, it could be proposed that executive function (as measured by Spinella’s
index) informs or modulates the constructs of personality traits, as measured in the five-factor
personality inventory, or vice versa. In order to test this possibility, a partial correlation was
performed between the EFI subscales, the composite scores of cognitive flexibility, inhibitory
control, and working memory, while controlling for the five scales of personality. Of all the
possible correlations, the relationship between EFI Organization and inhibitory control was
significant, r(253) = .019. Thus, it can be argued that all but one of the subscales within the EFI
measure personality traits rather than executive function constructs.
The high and low EFI subscale comparisons substantiate the one significant partial
correlation previously identified. The significant difference between high and low EFI
Organization on inhibitory control offers additional support that the EFI Organization subscale is
the one part of the EFI that demonstrates the ability to measure some executive function, in
particular, inhibitory control. In addition, the EFI Organization was also the only subscale that
demonstrated differences in consumer behavior between high and low groups. However, the
additional subscales of the EFI demonstrated no significant differences within groups on
executive functions. Consequently, the correlational results from this study, as well as extreme
group comparisons, offer minimal evidence of the Executive Function Index as a strong and
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valid measure of executive function, at least as measured with the present tasks that were
selected to reflect Miyake and Friedman’s (2012) model.
A different picture emerges from the between-groups comparisons of task performance,
summarized in
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Table 3.. Results from the purchasing task within Study 2 indicate significant differences
between working memory groups (as measured by a composite score of Corsi and N-back tasks)
on consumer behavior. In fact, extreme groups formed on working memory scores differed not
only in how often an individual chose to purchase, but also how much hypothetical money was
spent, the difference between the participant’s stated budget and the amount spent, as well as
how well the participant kept a running tally of the amount spent or remembered what their
initial budget was at the time they finished the tasks. Individuals who scored higher in working
memory were more successful in self-regulatory behaviors in the purchasing task by using
updating and monitoring skills more successfully than individuals with lower working memory.
These results support the common finding that working memory capacity is closely related to
self-regulatory behavior (Barratt, 2004; Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003; Ilkowska & Engele,
2010; Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008; Hofmann, Schmeichel, &
Baddeley, 2012; Witney, 2003).
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Table 3.9 Summary of extreme-groups differences from Study 2

High Working Memory

Low Working Memory
<Purchase Total
<Impulsive Purchase
<Purchase Difference
<Purchase Total Known

High Purchase Total

Low Purchase Total
<Working Memory

High Inhibitory Control

Low Inhibitory Control
<Impulse Action
>Working Memory

High EFI Organization

Low EFI Organization
<Purchase Total
<Impulsive Purchase
>Inhibitory Control

Regarding personality traits and consumer behavior, Study 2 did not replicate the
relationship between conscientiousness and impulsive consumer behavior identified in both parts
of Study 1. A strong correlation between EFI Strategic Planning and Conscientiousness was
identified, but neither were significantly associated with any measures of consumer behavior
within Study 2. In addition, the EFI measures of Motivational Drive and Strategic Planning,
which correlated with personality instead of executive function as measured by cognitive
measures, were not significantly related to consumer behavior either.
Thus, within Study 2, behavioral measures that were selected because they are widely
used to measure the executive-function component of working memory were shown to be related
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to consumer behavior. However, almost all EFI measures failed to display any relationship with
consumer behavior. Again, this seems consistent with the interpretation of EFI as a personality
measure rather than a reliable measure of some executive cognitive ability or operation.
For self-reported impulsivity (measured by the BIS-8), both inhibitory control and
working memory revealed differences for Impulse Action but not for Impulse Plan. In addition,
the EFI subscales of Organization and impulse control were also measures that relate to
impulsive consumer behavior. These results somewhat replicate the findings by Witney, Jameson
and Hinson (2004) that working memory capacity and inhibitory control are associated with
overall impulsiveness and, more specifically, motor impulsiveness. However, they differ in that
working memory capacity correlates with non-planning impulsiveness but not attentional, and
vice versa for inhibitory control. These results also align with Barrett and colleagues’ proposal
(2003) that variability within self-regulatory behaviors of individuals is an outcome of
participants’ ability to override the automatic, habit driven processing by using executive
function resources. Relevant to the present study, variability in impulsive consumer behavior can
be accounted for by an individual’s executive function abilities, and, as Barratt and colleagues
suggested, those resources are working memory capacity and inhibitory control.
Thus, the results from Study 2 replicate findings from Study 1 and provide some additional
evidence that the self-report measures of EFI Organization and EFI Impulse Control and the
executive function tasks of working memory and perhaps inhibitory control (while not
correlating strongly) reflect some common behaviors and cognitive processing, and other
subscales of the EFI reflect cognitive flexibility and/or personality traits. Furthermore, the
measures of EFI Organization and impulse control also demonstrate relations with impulsive
consumer behavior similarly but not as strongly as the behavioral cognitive assessments of
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working memory and inhibitory control. It is interesting to note that, as in Study 1, of the two
types of impulsivity, Impulse Action was found to be significantly related with inhibitory
control, with differences in working memory capacity also approaching the conservative
threshold for statistical significance.
Finally, the results indicate that, of the three components in Miyake and Friedman’s (2012)
model for executive function, working memory was found to be most strongly related to selfregulation as reflected in consumer behavior. Relevant to the present study, variability in
impulsive consumer behavior can be accounted for by an individual’s executive function
resources available at any moment. As Barratt (2004) suggested, and as the findings from this
study indicate, these resources appear to be working memory, or updating, as in Miyake &
Friedman’s framework.
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4

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Table 4.1 below summarizes the similarities and differences in findings from the studies
reported here. This investigation represents a new and unique attempt to identify and to
understand the relations between cognitive abilities, personality traits, and impulsive consumer
behavior. The goals of this present investigation were threefold. The first goal was to investigate
the relationship between executive function as measured by Spinella’s (2004) self-report
measure (the Executive Function Index) with personality traits and impulsive consumer
behavior. The second goal was to investigate the relationship between executive function, as
measured by standard cognitive assessments, with personality and consumer behavior. The final
goal was to test the validity of the Executive Function Index (Spinella, 2004) for measuring
Miyake and Friedman’s (2012) Unity/Diversity model of executive function, as measured by
behavioral assessments. In other words, to understand how the EFI relates to executive function
measured by cognitive assessments.
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Table 4.1. Comparison of primary results from Studies 1A, 1B and 2.
Study 1A and Study 1B
EFI Impulse Control and EFI Organization were
correlated with Impulse Action. ***

Study 2
EFI Impulse Control, EFI Organization, Working
Memory and Inhibitory Control were correlated with
Impulse Action. ***

EFI Impulse control and EFI Organization were
correlated with individual impulsive consumer
behavior measures. *

EFI Impulse Control and EFI Organization were the
only self-report measures of the EFI that correlated
with cognitive measures. *

EFI Strategic Planning was correlated with Impulse
Plan. *

All EFI measures were more strongly correlated with
personality measures than cognitive assessments. *

Conscientiousness was correlated with EFI
Organization and Impulse Action. **

Conscientiousness was correlated with EFI Strategic
Planning and Impulse Plan. **

EFI Motivational Drive was correlated with both
Openness and Extroversion. ***

EFI Motivational Drive was correlated with both
Openness and Extroversion. ***

EFI Organization and EFI Impulse Control extreme
groups demonstrate differences in consumer behavior.
People who scored lowest in EFI ORG and EFI IC
reported significantly more impulsive consumer
behavior than people with high scores. ***

Working Memory tasks and EFI Organization high and
low groups demonstrate similar differences in
consumer behavior. Differences replicate findings in
Study One. ***

EFI Impulse Control extreme groups demonstrated no
significant differences in consumer behavior. **
Impulse Action, but not Impulse Plan, extreme groups
significantly differ in consumer behavior, with high
Impulse Action group showing high impulse consumer
behavior. ***

Impulse Action, but not Impulse Plan, high/low groups
demonstrate differences in consumer behavior, and
replicated findings in study one. ***

Both Working Memory and Inhibitory control high/low
groups demonstrated differences in Impulse Action but
not Impulse Plan. **
Conscientiousness extreme groups demonstrate
differences in consumer behavior. **

Conscientiousness nor any other personality measures,
high/low groups showed no differences in consumer
behavior. **

Note: *** reflects findings that replicated across studies; ** indicates failures to replicate; * indicates
results that are unique to one study.

The first question asked in this dissertation was, “What is the relation between
personality, impulsive consumer behavior, and executive function, as measured by the Executive
Function Index, a self-report measure?” Findings from these studies offer the following answers
to this question. First, of the Executive Function Index subscales, the EFI Organization appears
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to be most related to impulsive consumer behavior. Higher EFI Organization scores were
associated with lower spending behavior, lower financial risk taking, lower credit-card misuse,
and opportunity seeking, and with higher value seeking in Study 1. Similarly, extreme groups
formed on the basis of EFI Organization score differed significantly in consumer behavior.
Additionally, EFI Impulse Control appeared to be related to consumer behavior in lower
spending, financial risk taking, credit card misuse, and opportunity seeking, and higher value
seeking in Study 1. The EFI Organization subscale was also found to be related to impulsive
consumer behavior, as evidenced by the Purchasing Task in Study 2. Individuals who were
higher in EFI Organization in Study 2 demonstrated less impulsive consumer behavior in the
purchasing task by purchasing less times and spending less money. These results suggest that the
EFI Organization and Impulse Control subscales, as measures of executive function, indicate
executive function as having a role in consumer behavior. The fact that Impulse Control is not
related to the measures of consumer behavior in Study 2 may be understood by the specific items
in the measure. The items for EFI Organization focus on remembering, maintaining, and
updating a sequence, monitoring, not losing track of a process, etc.; whereas the items for
Impulse Control focused more on control of inappropriate behaviors (i.e., sexual advances).
Thus, the Study 2 Purchasing task could reflect more of the behaviors measured in the EFI
Organization items than in EFI Impulse Control. This impact appears to replicate previous
studies that suggest better executive function informs consumer decision making through selfregulation supported by updating and monitoring. In addition, the same two subscales are also
related to a type of impulsivity (Impulse Action) that is itself associated with impulsive
consumer behavior whereas personality measures, namely conscientiousness, was related to
Impulse Plan, a type of impulsivity not associated to consumer behavior.
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The only relationship identified between personality and consumer behavior is the
high/low groups differences in Conscientiousness in consumer behavior in Study 1A and Study
1B. The relationship between Conscientiousness and consumer behavior was not replicated in
Study 2. No additional findings from this study suggested relations between personality
measures and impulsive consumer behavior (i.e., correlations were significant, but very small);
however, personality measures were significantly associated with the Executive Function Index
subscales (Motivational Drive and Strategic Planning) that were themselves not related to
consumer behavior. This finding supports Fleming, Heintzelman, and Bartholow’s (2016)
contention that the personality trait of conscientiousness is associated with mental set-shifting
but not working memory (updating) or inhibitory control. The results, finding a relationship
between conscientiousness and consumer behavior in Study 1A and Study 1B but not in Study 2,
in addition to Fleming, et. al.’s (2016) finding, bolster the prediction that measures of cognitive
flexibility are not associated with consumer behavior. It is interesting that the present findings
from Study 2 were consistent with that prediction in that cognitive flexibility did not demonstrate
any relationship with consumer behavior.
Thus, for the first goal, this study suggests that two subscales of the EFI, Organization
and Impulse Control, have some relationship with consumer behavior, and that the other
subscales of the EFI are more closely related to personality, as the other subscales show no
relationship to consumer behavior.
For the second goal, the question was asked, “What is the relation between standard
cognitive or behavioral assessments of executive function, personality, and consumer behavior?
The findings from an investigation into the relationship between working memory and
impulsivity provided some preliminary insight and support (albeit certainly not conclusive) for
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Hinson, Witney, and Jameson’s (2003) claim that impulsivity is mainly an adaptive behavior for
low working memory, and trait impulsivity can be largely accounted for by individual
differences in working memory capacity.
According to Friedman and Miyake (2017), common EF is representing, implementing,
and maintaining goals. However, Engle (2018) and others have concluded that working memory
capacity is also goal maintenance through controlled attention, as opposed to updating and
integrating of information as measured by Nback and Corsi, used in this study. Thus, for this
study, goals regarding financial health must be attended to, and working memory would be used
for updating and integrating information, in addition to monitoring current financial state as it
pertains to the goal of financial health. The ambiguous role of inhibitory control in this study, as
associated with Impulse Action but not consumer behaviors, may actually offer support to this
perspective of Common EF as inhibitory control for maintenance of goals. Inhibitory control can
be seen as framework or scaffolding in which goals are perpetually secured regardless of
incorporation or updating of new information. In Study 2’s Purchasing Task, long term goal
maintenance was not necessary for a hypothetical purchasing task. Within the context of Study 2,
goals for the tasks as well as the survey purchasing outcomes would be to act in a financially
responsible manner, particularly to remain within a budget and not spend money beyond their
budget, but there were minimal to no distractions of classically-conditioned advertisements or
other long-term distractions that compete for one’s attention in daily life. There were also no
significant consequences for not maintaining their goals, and for some individuals, the goal that
was being represented and maintained most likely would have been to finish the task as soon as
possible to receive their payment. Therefore, in this study, it is evident that executive function, as
defined and modeled by Friedman and Miyake’s (2017) current model, informs consumer
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behavior. First, Common EF, or goal maintenance provides a backdrop matrix of goal-related
information by which an individual then updates and monitors information against to evaluate
the potential consequences of an action. The matrix of inhibition could possible bias perception
to help maintain ongoing goals, and at a minimum make choices about what to buy and when to
buy it easier. Working memory would update current state, but the decision at hand would be
viewed through the lens of goal maintenance (i.e., what the participant was instructed to or trying
to accomplish). For this current study, however, the purchasing task did not require goal
maintenance in consumer decision making; that is, participants were not required to keep track of
expenditures or to remain within a fixed budget. Thus, executive function component with the
strongest relation to purchasing behavior was found to be working memory (mental updating)
rather than inhibition (controlled attention to inhibit prepotent tendencies to spend in ways
antithetical to the participant’s goals).
Witney, Jameson, and Hinson (2003) demonstrated differences in relations between types
of impulsivity and working memory capacity and inhibition. Although factor analysis determined
two subtypes of impulsivity in this study, as opposed to the three subtypes listed in Witney, et
al.’s work, the current findings substantiate the Witney and collaborators’ results that types of
impulsivity do, in fact, relate to some of Miyake and Friedman’s factors of executive function.
Like Witney, et al.’s findings, the present study suggested that inhibitory control is related to
motor impulsivity, as reflected in an impulse action measure. However, unlike Witney, et. al.’s
findings, no factors of executive function (working memory, inhibitory control, or cognitive
flexibility) were related to Impulse Plan in this study. Rather, only the personality trait of
conscientiousness demonstrated a strong relation with Impulse Plan.
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There was no significant relationship between Inhibitory Control (as measured by
behavioral measures of Stroop, Stop Signal and Go/No-Go, and defined as inhibiting responses
to nonrelevant stimuli) and Impulse Control (as measured by EFI IC, with items referencing
inhibition of inappropriate behavior) or impulsive consumer behavior (defined in Study 2 as
more purchases and more money spent). In fact, the stronger of these relationships identified in
the current study was between Inhibitory Control and Impulse Action (as measured by BIS-8,
with items referencing motor control). These results suggest that the measures of Inhibitory
Control and Impulse Control do not reflect the same cognitive processes, despite the similarity of
their names and what would seem to be overlap in their meanings (i.e., stopping responses to
irrelevant or unfavorable stimuli). However, the present results provide little insight into what
these indices actually measure, and which seems most likely to be useful in understanding the
role of inhibitory control in consumer behavior.
The results for this study reflect Barratt’s (2004) proposal that working memory capacity
contributes to self-regulation within the dual-process model. Barratt discussed three mechanisms
through which individual differences in controlled attention manifest in variations of self-control.
First, working memory capacity is associated with tolerance of ambiguity. Tolerance of
ambiguity would reflect the ability to monitor and simultaneously hold conflicting information.
Barratt (2001) also suggested that uncertainty places cognitive load on an individual, thus
making correct evaluation of future choice while holding or maintaining evaluation of the
immediate option more difficult. Individuals with high capacity for working memory would
therefore be at an advantage over low WMC individuals in resolving ambiguous and uncertain
situations. Within the present study, one may question whether the requirement to monitor and
update amounts of purchase creates ambiguity and uncertainty for the individual. If he or she is
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unable to predict (as they were) how many purchasing questions, in what order, or what the
potential outcome of the purchasing task would be (e.g., if there were real-world consequence to
responses in the purchasing task), the participant could be cognitively loaded. In addition, the
time limit of one hour for Study 2 could load a participant as well. This cognitive load would
certainly affect outcomes of individuals with high versus low working memory, as Barratt
suggested.
Second, Barratt (2001) argued that working memory capacity assists an individual’s
ability to resist attentional capture and thus allows the person to maintain goal-oriented control.
Within this dissertation, individuals with the ability to maintain the budget and monitor and
update how closely their running purchases amounted to that total were the individuals who
scored higher in working memory. This is evidenced by the significant differences in the high
and low working memory group comparisons on purchasing behavior.
Third, Barratt suggested that working memory capacity may influence an individual’s
ability to suppress classically-conditioned affective associations not relevant or optimal at that
time. The present study does not directly support or negate this claim. However, within the two
survey studies, individuals with high scores in the EFI Organization and EFI Impulse Control
subscales demonstrated real-life decisions that would include resisting attractive advertisement
and attractive get-rich-quick opportunities by scoring lower in spending behavior and
opportunity seeking, and higher in control over risky financial behaviors, as well as overall
impulsive consumer behavior. Although this study does not directly test the validity of Barratt’s
claim, the outcomes do rely on overriding impulses and resisting attractive advertisement.
Therefore, the differences between high and low executive function groups in the measured
outcomes may substantiate Barratt’s claim.
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Regarding Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, and Schmit’s (2008) claim that
working memory capacity moderates the relation between automatic and controlled precursors
and behaviors, the current study offers support. In particular, the second study demonstrates
individuals with higher working memory were less likely to purchase impulsively or to extend
beyond their stated budget. Hofmann et. al. could explain this result by suggesting that
individuals with lower working memory capacity were more inclined to succumb to automatic
impulses, such as the emotional appeal of getting the newer, bigger, and fancier option, of
purchase.
For the third goal, the question was asked, “How does the Executive Function Index
relate to Executive Function, as measured by traditional cognitive assessments. With regard to
the Executive Function Index (EFI) and its validity, the results suggest that some subscales of the
EFI do indeed relate, although not strongly, with the behavioral measures known to measure
cognitive flexibility, inhibitory control, and working memory capacity. Two subscales of the EFI
(Impulse control and Organization) were significantly, but weakly (i.e., accounting for less than
five percent of the variability), correlated with measures of all three of Miyake and Friedman’s
(2012) components: updating, cognitive flexibility/shifting, and inhibitory control. However,
although these two EFI subscales correlated with behavioral assessments of executive function,
the remaining subscales of the EFI were not significantly related to any cognitive behavioral
assessments of executive function. The EFI subscales of Motivational Drive, Empathy, and
Strategic Planning seem not to measure or relate to executive functions found in the three
cognitive components in the Unity/Diversity model. However, two of these three EFI subscales,
Motivational Drive and Strategic Planning, did correlate somewhat strongly moderately well
with personality traits.
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A potential explanation for the findings is that some (perhaps all, as even Org and IC had
largest correlations with some of the Big Five, as is discussed below) of Spinella’s EFI were
more strongly correlated with personality measures instead of executive functions could be
grounded in findings by Murdock, Oddi, and Bridgett (2013) that some executive functions
could be significantly related to personality. For example, these authors found working memory
capacity to be significantly related to neuroticism and to openness. That is, individuals with high
working memory scores were more open to experience, more extroverted, and less neurotic.
Whereas findings such as these demonstrate potential relationships between personality and
executive functions, this current study only found significant correlations between the self-report
survey results, not the behavioral indicators of executive functioning. Thus, it is just as plausible
that the relationships could be accounted for by similarity in assessment delivery. That is,
common method variance may inflate correlations; thus, it may be expected that the measures of
self-report survey may appear to be more closely related with each other than the behavioral
measures and survey scales.
One can infer that the EFI not only measures executive functions but personality traits as
well, therefore suggesting either that the EFI is not a valid measure of executive function or that
executive functions and personality traits overlap. Or it may be inferred that the state of mind or
state of personality, as personality can have slight fluctuations, the individual is experiencing
influences self-report measures of anything, including executive function. The more
parsimonious answer would be the EFI lacks validity as a ‘pure’ measure of executive function,
as a substantial amount of research would be needed to verify the claim that executive function
and personality traits could inform or account for each other.
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Current research does suggest, however, that there is some relation between personality,
as measured by the Big Five, and cognition. For example, Soubelet & Salthouse (2010)
identified some strong relations between personality and cognition across life span. In particular,
higher Openness was positively correlated and associated with four cognitive ability factors:
fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, episodic memory, and perceptual speed. They also
found that higher Extraversion was associated with lower levels of fluid and crystalized
intelligence. Unsworth, et. al. (2009) found Neuroticism was weakly and negatively related to
fluid intelligence; however, Openness was not related to fluid intelligence, nor were
Agreeableness nor Conscientiousness related to any measures of executive functions (Flanker,
Ospan, Antisaccade, Raven, Letter fluency). Buchanan (2016) tested for correlations between
personality measures, self-report executive function (Webexe; Buchanan, 2010), and standard
cognitive assessments (Trail-Making, Digit Span, and Semantic Fluency). Buchanan identified in
three studies some strong relationships between self-reported executive dysfunction or problems
and Neuroticism and low Conscientiousness, with moderate to strong effects. However,
Openness was not related to any measures of executive function. Thus, existing results regarding
the relationship between personality and executive function are somewhat inconsistent. The
current literature is inadequate to make claims, and additional research is needed.
In this current study, some relations between personality and self-report measures of
executive function were similarly identified, although the majority of these correlations were
weak to moderate. In particular, Motivational Drive was related to Extraversion and Openness,
and Strategic planning was related to Conscientiousness. What is most interesting, however, is
that the relationships were found with executive function self- report measures not correlated
with standard cognitive assessments. Thus, the conclusion may possibly follow that the subscales
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of the EFI Motivational Drive and Strategic Planning failed to measure executive function, and
thus that there are no executive functions truly measured with the EFI. Rather, it appears that the
EFI measures one’s attitudes or beliefs about one’s executive functions.
The result from Study 2 indicated the following: Only the EFI subscales of organization
and impulse control demonstrated relations with standard cognitive assessments that were
selected to reflect components within Miyake and Friedman’s (2012) model. In particular, these
two subscales seemed to be most related to working memory (updating) and maybe inhibitory
control (common EF), albeit to a lesser degree. For example, EFI Organization items included
references to consolidation and updating information and maintaining a sequence of information
whereas EFI Impulse Control items reflected real-world impulsivity like inappropriate sexual
advances and swearing. These items, of all the EFI agreement statements, are most likely to
reflect behavior associated with working memory and impulse control. The remaining subscales
of the EFI were not related to cognitive assessments of Miyake and Friedman’s Unity/Diversity
Model but rather measures of personality. In addition, working memory and the Executive
Function Index subscale of organization demonstrated overlap in the relation with consumer
behavior, with working memory demonstrating stronger effects. These findings challenge
Spinella’s (2004) claim that all of the factors in his index, Strategic Planning, Organization,
Motivational Drive, Empathy, and Impulse Control, measure factors of executive function, and
should be related to cognitive assessments of executive function. Also, these findings challenge
Spinella’s assertion that the correlation of the Executive Function Index to other self-report
measures previously validated with behavioral measures validate the EFI. Although the relations
observed here between EFI subscales and standard cognitive behavioral tasks were not strong,
the two subscales of Impulse Control and Organization did indicate some relationship with
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executive function, as well as with impulsive consumer behavior. In particular, the two subscales
of Impulse Control and Organization replicated the same relationship as working memory and
impulsive consumer behavior, although more weakly. Thus, the findings of this study suggest the
EFI needs additional work to become a valid self-report measure of executive function.
It appears from these studies that only one of the components of Miyake and Friedman’s
(2012) model, namely working memory, directly informs impulsive consumer behavior. In
addition, personality is not associated with impulsive consumer behavior, nor does it interact
with working memory with regards to impulsive consumer behavior. Finally, there is some
evidence that inhibitory control offers supports or is a type of scaffolding for the effects of
working memory within impulsive consumer behavior.
With regards to the EFI and impulsive consumer behavior, both parts of Study 1, with a
total of over 12,000 participants, revealed a significant relationship between the two EFI
subscales of Impulse Control and Organization and consumer behavior. Part B of Study One
replicated findings in Part A that individual differences in Impulse Control and Organization
were in fact related to impulsive consumer behavior. These two subscales were also the only
subscales significantly related to behavioral measures of executive function. A strong inference
may thus be made that executive function, as measured by two subscales of the Executive
Function Index, is indeed related to impulsivity within consumer behavior. However, in Study 2,
EFI Organization was the only subscale to be related to consumer behavior. Also, the relations
between personality measures and EFI subscales were stronger than the relations between EFI
subscales and behavioral measures of executive function. In addition, of the behavioral measures
for components of executive function, working memory was found to demonstrate an association
with consumer behavior. Thus, a potential inference from these studies may be that EFI
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Organization measures (or perhaps requires) working memory. This inference would explain
why groups formed on the basis of high/low working memory (Nback and Corsi) and EFI
Organization similarly differed significantly on measures of consumer behavior.
In conclusion, this study confirms that executive function plays a role within consumer
decision making and consumer behavior. In both studies, executive function, as measured first by
a self-report measure and then secondly by standard cognitive assessments, was inversely related
with impulsive consumer behavior. Specifically, working memory demonstrated the strongest
relationship with impulsive consumer behavior.
One limitation of this project would be the need to parse out individuals in the second
study who did not engage and respond honestly during the study. Because the methodology of
this study was an online survey, participant engagement could not be monitored. Although the
number of participants not fully engaged in each task should be minimal in this study, as
responses from individuals who responded under a specific time (seven minutes) were removed
from the study, additional insight into participant engagement could be helpful. A recording of
individual task and question response times would be helpful to understand whether any
immediate yes/no answers to each individual question simply reflected disengagement (i.e.,
participants just clicking without reading to end the survey sooner).
A second limitation is the question of reality. The question must arise that individuals
may respond in a different manner if their real money is at stake. For example, one must question
whether chronic or acute financial distress could load an individual. This load, per Hinson et. al.
(2003), could in turn affect consumer behavior by disallowing the individual the opportunity to
evaluate long-term reward as well as short-term rewards correctly. The purchasing questions
generated for Study 2 were designed to maximize the participants’ experience of making real-life
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purchases; nevertheless, it remains to be determined whether the relations observed here would
generalize to decision-making in a real-life phone purchase, for example.
In addition, as part the issue with real-world experience, a limitation on Study 2 is the
failure of necessity for goal maintenance. Participants were asked to name their hypothetical
budget but were given no instructions or reward for maintaining the budget. Adding instructions
and an incentive to engage a goal of remaining under budget may offer enough incentive to
perform goal maintenance, and in doing so, engage common EF in participants.
To conclude, the study identified working memory as the component of executive
function that informs purchasing behavior. Higher working memory is associated with consumer
behavior outcomes associated with self-regulation, such as less spending, more value seeking,
and staying within a budget. Additionally, this study tested a self-report measure of executive
function and found that while one subscale was related to some consumer behavior and
minimally related to behavior measures of working memory, the majority of it to be more closely
associated with personality.
To further the findings of this study, additional studies may contain the following: First, a
follow-up study using methodology that replicates real-life spending scenarios would address the
question of whether or not hypothetical money is handled differently, thus affecting consumer
decision making. In this scenario, a participant would receive a specific spending amount, and a
purchase to be made. Upsells would be given, with the understanding the amount not spent is
kept for future purchases of their choice. Additionally, with the correct technology, a study in
which real-world purchase options in real-time on a participants’ phone would address these
limitations.
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Second, a follow-up study should address the need for practical means to improve
consumer decisions. Multiple studies have resulted in negative or inconclusive results for
Working Memory Capacity training (Shipstead, Redick, Engel, 2010); thus, countering
impulsive spending with memory training is not suggestable. Rather, training individuals in longterm goal maintenance may be a successful way to combat impulsive spending. In this model,
inhibitory control, or common EF should be investigated as a preemptive ability to maintain a
system of goals in spending choices. In other words, if an individual is trained to preempt a
choice, by biasing perception of environment or by simply training a habitual negative response
with qualifications, with a “no” or an agreement of choices to be made for spending, the choice
for yes is then only considered or contemplated within parameters. This training may then
minimize the need for larger amounts of working memory resources to evaluate and compare
smaller/sooner, bigger/later choices, or with load of emotional appeal. The choice is made prior
to consideration or emotionally appealing information. In this additional study, types of trainings
may be considered and tested. In particular, asking individuals to journal, pray, or contemplate
their particular financial goals prior to making a financial choice may be an effective means of
pre-empting impact of emotional appeal in advertising through time delay. In addition,
journaling, contemplating, or prayer may also serve as effective means of rehearsal of goals and
slow down impulsive decision making.
A third follow-up study should address the Executive Function Index. In particular,
another study should work to modify the EFI to correlate successfully with cognitive measures of
executive function. This study should also seek explicitly to test whether the EFI measures
individual’s beliefs about their executive function rather than EF itself. In other words, a study
should seek to parse out the influence an individual’s beliefs or perspective of their EF
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performance from actual objective knowledge of personal performance in executive function. It
is possible, of course, that the EFI accurately captures what participants understand about EF and
believe with respect to their own strengths and weaknesses, and still for those beliefs to be
inaccurate (as, for example, when one’s confidence is poorly calibrated to one’s accuracy). In
this follow-up study to explicate the relation of EFI and personality, additional self-report
measures that are unrelated to executive function should be included. By examining those
correlations, we may determine the degree to which the relation between EF and personality
reflect method variance (e.g., the manifest inter-correlation of all self-report measures) or if it is
something more meaningful, something that informs the literature about the influence of
personality on EF, and vice versa.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Executive Function Index

Rate how well each of the following statements describes you.
I have a lot of enthusiasm to do things. MD
When doing several things in a row, I mix up the sequence. ORG
I try to plan for the future. SP
I can sit and do nothing for hours.MD
I take risks, sometimes for fun. IC
I have trouble when doing two things at once, multi-tasking. ORG
I'm interested in doing new things. MD
I have a lot of concern for the well-being of other people. EMP
I'm an organized person. ORG
I save money on a regular basis. SP
I do or say things that others find embarrassing. IC
People who are foolish enough to be taken advantage of deserve it. EMP
I only have to make a mistake once in order to learn from it. SP
I tend to be an energetic person. MD
I make inappropriate sexual advances or flirtatious comments. IC
When someone is in trouble, I feel the need to help them. EMP
I sometimes I lose track of what I'm doing. ORG
I feel protective towards a friend who is being treated badly. EMP
I think about the consequences of an action before I do it. SP
I lose my temper when I get upset. IC
I take other people's feelings into account when I do something. EMP
I have trouble summing up information in order to make a decision with it. ORG
I start things, but then lose interest and do something else. ORG
I swear/use obscenities. IC
I don’t like it if my actions or words hurt someone else. EMP
I use strategies to remember things. SP
I monitor myself so that I can catch any mistakes. SP
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Appendix B: Credit Card Misuse Scale Items

1.

I am less concerned with the price of a product when I use a credit card.

2.

I rarely go over my available credit limit.

3.

I always pay off my credit cards at the end of the month.

4.

I am more impulsive when I shop with credit cards.

5.

I have too many credit cards.

6.

I worry how I will pay off my credit card debt.

7.

I seldom take cash advances on my credit cards.

8.

I often make only the minimum payment on my credit card bills.

9.

My credit cards are usually at their maximum credit limit.

10.

I frequently use available credit on one credit card to make a payment on another
credit card.

11.

I am seldom delinquent in making payments on my credit cards.

12.

I spend more when I use a credit card.
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Appendix C: Brief Barratt Impulsivity Measure (BIS-8)

How well do the following statements describe your personality? Please select “1” for strongly
disagree and “5” for strongly agree. [DO NOT RANDOMIZE]

I see myself as someone who…
1

I plan tasks carefully. (Plan)

2

I do things without thinking. (Action)

3

I don’t “pay attention.” (Action)

4

I am self-controlled. (Plan)

5

I concentrate easily. (Plan)

6

I am a careful thinker (Plan).

7

I say things without thinking. (Action)

8

I act on the spur of the moment. (Action).
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Appendix D: Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI)
Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please write a
number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that
statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one
characteristic applies more strongly than the other.
I see myself as:
1. _____ Extraverted, enthusiastic.
2. _____ Critical, quarrelsome.
3. _____ Dependable, self-disciplined.
4. _____ Anxious, easily upset.
5. _____ Open to new experiences, complex.
6. _____ Reserved, quiet.
7. _____ Sympathetic, warm.
8. _____ Disorganized, careless.
9. _____ Calm, emotionally stable.
10. _____ Conventional, uncreative.

TIPI scale scoring (‘‘R’’ denotes reverse-scored items): Extraversion: 1, 6R; Agreeableness: 2R,
7; Conscientiousness; 3, 8R; Emotional Stability: 4R, 9; Openness to Experiences: 5, 10R
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Appendix E: Descriptive Statistics for Study 1, Part A
Descriptive Statistics
N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

valueseeking

6122

1.00

7.00

4.5773

1.38420

spenders

6122

1.00

7.00

3.5939

1.65433

CCMIsuse

6122

1.00

5.00

2.4078

.81379

extroversion

6122

1.00

7.00

3.9137

1.34397

Agreeableness

6122

1.00

7.00

4.8239

1.17276

consicentiousness

6122

1.00

5.00

3.2560

1.05783

neuroticism

6122

1.00

7.00

3.4343

1.28605

Openness

6122

1.00

7.00

4.7821

1.18186

Impulseaction

6122

1.00

5.00

2.6800

.96624

Impulseplan

6122

1.00

5.00

2.2714

.80077

IMPULSE

6122

1.00

5.00

2.4757

.68269

EXFUNCOVERAL

6122

1.89

4.96

3.4246

.44892

EXEFMD

6122

1.00

5.00

3.4469

.71629

EXEFORG

6122

1.00

5.00

3.2260

.92920

EXEFSP

6122

1.29

5.00

3.4316

.57961

EXEFIC

6122

1.00

5.00

3.1930

.88420

EXEFEM

6122

1.00

5.00

3.7600

.70896

Valid N (listwise)

6122

L
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Appendix F: Descriptive Statistics for Study 1, Part A

114
Appendix G: Correlations for Study 1, Part B
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Appendix H: Descriptive Statistics for Study 1, Part B
N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

opportunityseekers

6000

1.00

7.00

1.7868

1.62829

ccmisuse

6000

1.00

5.00

2.2468

.82632

financialrisk

6000

2.00

10.00

3.8225

2.24384

agree2

6000

1.00

7.00

4.9910

1.19809

neuro2

6000

1.00

7.00

3.3421

1.35766

open2

6000

1.00

7.00

4.7416

1.19090

consien2

6000

1.00

7.00

5.4034

1.27782

EFI

6000

1.41

4.89

3.4963

.45759

impulseplan

6000

1.00

5.00

2.2203

.76752

impulseaction

6000

1.00

5.00

2.5141

.98643

impulsivity

6000

1.00

5.00

2.3672

.69138

extro2

6000

1.00

7.00

3.7813

1.40603

execmd

6000

1.00

5.00

3.4266

.74739

execorg

6000

1.00

5.00

3.3540

.95573

execsp

6000

1.00

5.00

3.4441

.57993

execic

6000

1.00

5.00

3.4075

.93164

execem

6000

1.00

5.00

3.7962

.68400

Valid N (listwise)

6000
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Appendix I: Correlations for Study 1, Part B
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Appendix J: Correlations for Study 1, Part B
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Appendix K: Descriptive Statistics for Study 2
Behavioral Measures

N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

corsispan_mean

253

.000

5.700

3.922

1.082

Stroop differencescore

252

-230.228

932.642

120.678

131.713

taskswitch_mixcost

253

-592.949

1767.104

227.624

248.148

taskswitch_switchcost

253

-615.622

1342.712

320.288

528.154

gambling

253

.000

.930

.469

.218

gonogo_go_rt (ms)

253

186.157

985.000

417.209

82.726

gonogo_nogo_errorrate

253

.0

1.0

.136

.178

stopsignal_errorrate

253

.660

1.000

.856

.076

wisconsin_preservationerror

253

.066

.400

.154

.070

nbackmiss

251

.00

1.00

.319

.257

nbackfalspos

253

.00

.54

.128

.098

nbacktotal

252

.00

1.88

.4710

.360

Valid N (listwise)

250
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Appendix L: Descriptive Statistics for Study 2 Self-Report Measures
N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

Impulsivity

253

1

49

15.05

8.348

Credit card

253

.00

7.00

3.2451

1.13574

Motivational drive

253

1.75

7.00

4.7717

1.24285

Strategic planning

253

2.29

7.00

5.3027

.93255

Impulse control

253

1.25

7.00

4.5494

1.24105

Organization

253

.00

7.00

4.4964

1.33685

Credit card misuse

253

.00

5.91

2.8383

1.32323

Impulse plan

253

.00

25.00

5.9605

4.36236

Impulse action

253

1.00

27.00

9.0909

4.92600

extraversion

253

.5

6.5

3.008

1.8225

agreeableness

253

.0

7.0

4.891

1.4251

conscientiousness

253

1.5

7.0

5.170

1.2913

Emotionally stable

253

.0

7.0

4.488

1.6985

openness

253

.5

7.0

4.494

1.4124

Valid N (listwise)

253
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Appendix M: Purchasing Descriptive Statistics for Study 2
N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

purchasing.1

253

200

1000

315.55

131.125

purchasing2.1

253

1

2

1.33

.470

purchasing3.1

253

1

2

1.65

.478

purchasing4cruise.1

253

1

2

1.52

.501

purchasing6.1

253

1

2

1.70

.459

purchasing4b.1

253

1

2

1.87

.342

purchasing7.1

253

1

2

1.67

.470

purchasing8.1

253

1

2

1.77

.421

purchasing9.1

253

1

2

1.60

.490

buy9b.1

253

1

2

1.82

.386

purchasing11.1

253

1

2

1.91

.282

buy10.1

253

1

2

1.91

.282

purchasing12.1

252

0

1400

410.32

197.512

purchasing13.1

253

1

2

1.86

.350

purchasediff

253

-1750.00

498.00

-132.3518

219.54764

purchasebudget

253

-1800.00

350.00

-95.6877

302.22527

purchaseyesno

253

13.00

26.00

22.6087

2.99223

Valid N (listwise)

252
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Appendix N: Correlations for Study 2

122

123
Appendix O: Study 2 Correlations between EFI and Personality Measures
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Appendix P: Study 2 EFI and Cognitive Flexibility Correlations
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Appendix Q: Study 2 Correlations of Inhibitory Control Behavioral Measures and EFI
Subscales
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Appendix R: Study 2 Correlations of Working Memory Behavioral Measures and EFI
Subscales
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Appendix S: Correlations Study 2 Correlations of Working Memory Behavioral Measures
and EFI Subscales
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Appendix T: Partial Correlations of Personality Measures and EFI Subscales
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Appendix U: Purchasing Task Questions and Order of Behavioral Tasks

Age
Purchasing Q1: Your only mobile device has been damaged and needs to be replaced. You have
$1000 in savings to spend, but have other ideas for that money as well, including taking a
vacation, saving for the holidays, supporting a charitable cause, and maintaining an emergency
fund in savings. You can get a refurbished device that has all the functional features for $200
(minimum memory, adequate screen size, satisfactory function). However, it is a basic model.
You can purchase upgrades (and will be allowed to do so later in this survey). What is the most
from your $1000 would you be willing to spend on such a device, including those additional
upgrades?
-{min=200,max=1000}
Gender
Stopsignal
Purchasing Q2: Instead of getting a refurbished mobile device, you can get a brand new device
for only $200 more. Would you like to do that?
Go/nogo
Ethnicity
Purchasing Q3: You can purchase a waterproof, shatterproof case to protect your mobile device
for an additional $75? Would you like to do so?
- yes
- no
Purchasing Q4 Cruise: You just received an offer for a five night all inclusive Caribbean cruise
for just $300. Would you like to purchase this opportunity with your leftover savings?
TIPI Personality
Wisconsin Card Sort
Purchasing Q5: Regarding the mobile device mentioned earlier, adding memory allows you to
download more apps, stream more movies, and store more pictures, videos and music. Would
you be willing to pay an additional $150 for 50% more memory?
Nback 1
Purchasing Q5d: There is a special now for purchasing additional memory. You can buy 50%
more memory for just $75 now. Would you like to do so?
Nback 2
Barratt Impulsiveness 8
Purchasing Q6: You can increase photo resolution and add a zoom feature to the camera on your
mobile device for $30. Would you like to purchase this
TaskSwitching
Purchasing Q6b: About the mobile device mentioned earlier, the smallest screen is sometimes
difficult to read or to watch videos. For $80 more, you could upgrade to a newer version with
double the screen size. Would you want to have a larger mobile device for that amount of
money?
Stroop
Purchasing Q7: Would you like new bluetooth headphones to go with your mobile device for an
additional $75?
CORSI

130
Purchasing Q8: The current mobile device you have chosen comes with the most basic battery.
For an additional $50, you can upgrade the battery, allowing for ongoing usage without charge
for 48 hours. Would you like to purchase the battery upgrade?
CORSI 2
Purchasing Q9: The mobile device that you have chosen previously only comes in an obnoxious
lime green color for the price. Would you choose to pay an additional $50 for the color of your
choice?
Iowa Gambling
Purchasing Q10: A charger (with adapters for car and computer) is not included with your
mobile device. Would you like to add that on for $50?
Purchasing Q11: Currently, your mobile device comes with no policy for replacement if
damaged. You may add a plan that replaces your phone whenever it is damaged, no questions
asked, to your purchase for an additional $150 one-time fee. Would you like to do so?
Purchasing Q12: Phone security continues to be a concern, as the world becomes increasingly
more digital. You can upgrade your mobile device to the Maximum Security Subscription for a
flat fee of $150. Would you like to do that?
Purchasing Q13: You may select a service plan for your mobile device. For a one-time fee of
$175, you receive a year of unlimited one-on-one time with tech support from the mobile device
company. In addition, you do not have to set up an appointment and there will never be a wait
for this service. Would you like to purchase that plan?
Purchasing Q14: Just to be clear, can you tell me how much you have agreed to spend on your
mobile device up to this point?
Purchasing Q15: The provider of the mobile device discussed previously now has an offer for a
second, larger electronic tablet to go with your mobile device for only $250 more. Would you
want to accept that offer?
Credit Card Misuse
Purchasing Q15: What is the total you have spent on the mobile device?
Purchasing Q16: What was the original amount you budgeted for your mobile device plus
upgrades?

131
Appendix V: Study 1A, Means of Quartile Split Extreme Groups

Impulsive Purchasing

Mean

Behavior
Organization

Impulse Control

Std.

95% Confidence Interval

Error

Lower

Upper

Bound

Bound

Low

3.843

.022

3.800

3.886

Low Medium

3.574

.022

3.530

3.617

Medium

3.435

.058

3.320

3.549

High

2.565

.022

2.522

2.607

Low

3.945

.020

3.906

3.985

Low Medium

3.693

.020

3.654

3.733

Medium

3.336

.053

3.231

3.440

High

2.542

.020

2.503

2.581
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Appendix W: Study 1B, Means of Quartile Split Extreme Groups

Impulsive Purchasing

Mean

Behavior
Organization

Impulse Control

Std.

95% Confidence Interval

Error

Lower

Upper

Bound

Bound

Low

3.092

.010

2.073

2.111

Low Medium

2.056

.010

2.037

2.075

Medium

1.999

.010

1.980

2.018

High

1.742

.010

1.723

1.760

Low

3.107

.010

2.088

2.125

Low Medium

2.046

.010

2.027

2.065

Medium

1.983

.010

1.964

2.002

High

1.728

.009

1.710

1.747

